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1 Introduction 
Human rights are an important concept and tool for change. No one denies their existence, or 
that they should be upheld and defended. Still, it is a fact that human rights are violated in all 
parts of the world, and violations often go unnoticed or are plainly ignored by states, if not 
committed by the states themselves. This is why we have regional and international human 
rights systems. They have the task of monitoring compliance with human rights, and when 
seized by individuals, pass judgment on states efforts and violations.  
 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights (IACtHR or “the Court”), issue binding judgments on states.1 The Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) and the Committee against Torture (CtAT) issue views which are not 
strictly binding. Together they are some of the most influential of their kind, and receive  
thousands of petitions a year,2 on a huge variety of rights, all from the right to life, work and 
personal freedom.  
 
An important question to ask is whether the international and regional systems are able to 
monitor human rights violations effectively. The first question being whether victims get  
access to the justice these bodies are envisioned to provide. 
 
1.1 Background and research question 
In the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR or “the Convention”) 3, the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)4, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)5, the First Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)6, the International Convention 
                                                 
1 The Inter American system also has a Commission, while the European system abolished its Commission in 
1994, see Council of Europe Protocol no.11. 
2 The Inter-American system alone received more than 2000 petitions in 2013, see annual report: 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2013/TOC.asp  
3 Organization of American States, Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica, 1969. 
4 Council of Europe, 1950 
5 United Nations General Assembly, 1984 
6 United Nations General Assembly, 1966 
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on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)7 and the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)8 individual complaints are accepted, meaning  
individuals can bring cases to the body, commission or court entitled to hear such cases under 
the relevant law. Some systems can even order the State to make reparations for victims if a 
violation is found.9   
 
The thesis looks at the function and application of the principle of exhaustion of domestic  
remedies in the Inter-American system of human rights, to see if an effective protection of 
human rights is achieved here. Or, have the states set a procedural bar, intentionally or  
unintentionally, higher than most individuals can reach with the requirement of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies?10  
 
1.1.1 The Inter-American system 
The focus for this thesis will be the ACHR, developed by the Organization of American 
States (OAS), and enforced by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACmHR 
or “the Commission”) and the IACtHR. The Convention tries to balance the international 
wish for states to uphold human rights, with their right to have control in their own territory. 
With accepting a new convention states give up some of their power, and submit to external 
scrutiny and judgment. They undertake international legal obligations, which then must be 
kept. States do not take this lightly, nor do they give up such power without making restraints. 
One such restraint on international and regional scrutiny of human rights is the internationally 
recognized principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies.  
 
                                                 
7 United Nations General Assembly, 1965 
8 Organization of African Unity, the Banjul Charter, 1981.  
9 ACHR art 63 (1), CAT art 14. See Gina Donoso, Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ reparation 
judgments; Strengths and challenges for a comprehensive approach, Revista IIDH, vol 49, 2009; Bridget 
Mayeux and Justin Mirabal, Collective and Moral Reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, Human Rights Clinic, University of Texas School of Law, November 2009. 
10 The principle is sometimes referred to as the principle of exhaustion of local remedies. There is no difference 
except in the wording. In this thesis, domestic will be used consistently, except when quoting others.  
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The rule serves many purposes, but the perhaps most important is to prohibit petitions from 
reaching a regional level, before having tried to resolve the matter within the country  
concerned. States wanted the right to have primary jurisdiction over allegations against itself, 
and that regional jurisdiction be secondary. The IACtHR has stated numerous times, that the 
principle is mainly there for the benefit of the state,11 and states therefore allege this principle 
frequently.12  
 
The rule however is not without exceptions, and the Inter-American system has three; where 
there is no remedy, no access to remedies or where there are unwarranted delays. Exceptions 
are necessary to protect the individual, because the state itself has control over domestic  
remedies. Without exceptions to the rule there could be a danger of abuse, and it must “be 
borne in mind that the international protection of human rights is founded on the need to  
protect the victim from the arbitrary exercise of governmental authority.”13 It is also important 
that the rule and its exercise does not lead to regional protection being illusionary or without 
function.14 
 
In the last 10 years on average 10% of petitions, in total 29 petitions, have been rejected due 
to failure to exhaust domestic remedies by the Commission.15 In the same period, the Court  
rejected no cases on exhaustion of domestic remedies.16  So does this mean that exhaustion of 
domestic remedies work as it should? Is the principle in practice able to balance the state’s 
wish for primary jurisdiction against the protection of individual from states arbitrary exercise 
of power? Does the principle uphold order between the domestic system and the international 
one, or is it becoming a hindrance for petitioners seeking access to regional justice? 
 
 
                                                 
11 IACtHR, Viviana Gallardo et al .v. Costa Rica, 1981, para 26.  
12 Ajit Singh, “American Convention on Human Rights Articles 46 ( 1 )( a ) and 46 ( 2 )( c ): Achilles Heel or 
Trojan Horse ?,” Inter-American and European Human Rights Journal, Vol. 5, No. 1-2, 5 (2013)  p. 17.  
13 IACtHR, Velásquez-Rodríguez v . Honduras, preliminary objections, 1987, para 90, IACtHR, Fairén-Garbi 
and Solís-Corrales v . Honduras, preliminary objections, 1987, para 92. 
14 IACtHR, Velásquez-Rodríguez v . Honduras, Merits, 1988, para 64 
15 See chapter 11.  
16 Only two cases were rejected at the preliminary stage, both in 2004 and on jurisdiction issues.  
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The thesis will look into these numbers and try to find tendencies and possible recurring  
difficulties in the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies to answer the most important  
question of the principle; “Is the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies an acceptable  
obstacle or an impossible barrier for the individual seeking access to the Inter-American  
human rights system?” 
 
1.2 Methodology 
Articles and books describing the Inter-American regional system of human rights and ACHR 
art 46, its history and functions, will be the main sources for this thesis, in combination with 
several cases heard before the IACmHR and the IACtHR. Further, as the rule is similar 
throughout all mayor regional and international conventions, examples will also be drawn 
from other bodies’ practices and theory, when relevant.  
 
1.3 Goal, scope and roadmap  
ACHR article 46, contains admissibility requirements a petition must fulfil. The thesis will 
only discuss the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies, and will not deal with other rules 
for admissibility. The goal is to draw out the scope, highlight how it works, and see if it  
hinders cases being heard. In short, to show the principles strengths and weaknesses, and how 
they affect the individuals access to justice.  
 
The thesis will begin with a short description of the Inter-American system of human rights, 
to put the principle in its structural context. A general background of the principle will follow, 
with history and reasons for the principle, both in international and human rights law, as well 
as an introduction to the discussion on the nature of the principle. This will give an  
introduction to the topic and of the principles importance.  The thesis will then describe the 
different aspects of the application of the principle, from how to exhaust and when, the burden 
of proof and its exceptions, to show the reality of the principle and the demands on the  
petitioner and state.  
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Last will be a case-study of all the cases rejected17 before the IACmHR in the last five years 
to shed light on the cases rejected for non-exhaustion, how many there are and why they could 
not fulfill. The conclusion will sum up the findings and try to answer the thesis question, and 
contemplate why it seems to be an acceptable procedural bar and not an impossible one. 
 
2 The Inter-American system of Human Rights 
The Inter-American system for protecting human rights consists of several bodies,  
conventions and mechanisms. In this thesis only two will be highlighted; the IACmHR and 
IACtHR.  
 
2.1 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
The Commission was established in 1959, by mandate from the Fifth Meeting of Consultation 
of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, and the OAS adopted its statute in 1960. It worked as an  
autonomous entity of the OAS promoting human rights, until 1970 when the Protocol of  
Buenos Aires came into force, making the Commission a formal OAS organ.18 As an OAS 
organ, the Commission is set the task of promoting the observance and protection of human 
rights.19 
 
With the adoption of the ACHR in 1969, the Commission was also set the task of promoting 
and defending the human rights set forth in the convention, and is therefore both an official 
OAS charter organ and a convention organ, unlike the IACtHR, which is only a convention 
organ. This means that the Commission has a wider jurisdiction than the IACtHR, as it has 
jurisdiction over both the Convention and the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man (the Declaration),20 while the Court only has jurisdiction over the Convention.  
 
                                                 
17 All available cases online, three cases could not be accessed.  
18 OAS, Charter of the Organization of American States, 1967, art 53 (e). 
19 OAS Charter art 106; The International Justice Project, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: 
How Can it be Utilized in a Capital Case? 
20 Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948. 
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Consisting of seven members, elected in their personal capacity from the member states of the 
OAS, the Commission sits in Washington D.C, USA. It performs a variety of functions, rang-
ing from promotional and educational activities, to considering specific situations, countries 
and individual petitions. It has helped draft human rights instruments, consults the OAS  
Permanent Council and General Assembly and produced human rights documents and  
pamphlets.21 It has further done on-site investigations, prepared studies on observance and 
advised states on their practices.22 For this thesis, the most important function is the ability to 
consider individual petitions.23  
 
The Commission has the ability to receive both individual and inter-state complaints, but only 
one inter-state complaint has been received.24 In contrast the Commission receives on average 
1.500 individual petitions a year, with approximately 250 cases being opened and 70 deemed 
admissible.25 The individual complaint mechanism is mandatory with ratification of the con-
vention, as is the jurisdiction of the Commission. The inter-state complaints mechanism  
however, is optional and has to be specifically accepted by OAS member states. When  
dealing with a petition the Commission will first consider its admissibility, including  
exhaustion of domestic remedies. If a case is found inadmissible this is a quasi-judicial  
decision which cannot be appealed.26 
 
After a ruling on the merits, the Commission can refer the case to the IACtHR, if the state is 
party to the Convention and has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court. The Commission then 
takes the position as prosecutor of legal order before the Court, arguing its views on the case.  
 
 
                                                 
21 Buergenthal, Shelton and Stewart, “International Human Rights in a nut shell”, West Publishing, 4th edition, 
2009, p. 268-269.  
22 Felipe González, The Experience of the Inter-American Human Rights System, 40 VUWLR, p. 103-126, 2009.  
23 Convention, art 41 (f). 
24 Buergenthal, p. 287. The complaint (Nicaragua v. Costa Rica) was found inadmissible due to non-exhaustion 
of domestic remedies by the individuals of the applicant state.  
25 Lisa J. Reinsberg, Advocacy before the Inter-American System: A Manual for Autorneys and Advocates, sec-
ond edition, 2014, p. 25-26.  
26 Buergenthal, p. 293.  
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2.2 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The Court was established with the adoption of the ACHR in 1969. It is charged with the 
power to consider violations by states of the convention, as well as give advisory opinions and 
interpret its own judgments.27 It consists of seven judges, elected in their personal capacity, 
and sits in San José, Costa Rica.28  
 
For the Court to hear a case the proceedings before the Commission must have been ful-
filled,29 and only the Commission or the relevant state can submit the case to the Court.30  
Individuals cannot take a case to the Court but, have standing before the Court, once it has 
been submitted by the Commission or the state.31 In the considerations of the case the Court 
has power to fully review the Commission’s findings of fact, law and admissibility.32 This 
means that the Court for example can review whether an applicant had exhausted all the  
domestic remedies, or whether it agrees with the Commission on the application of an  
exception to exhaustion. According to art 67 of the Convention, a judgment from the Court is 
final and there are no appeals. Art 67 also gives the Court jurisdiction to give an interpretation 
of its own judgments, if there is a dispute over the meaning or scope. Any non-compliance 
with judgments from states shall be reported to the General Assembly of the OAS, which can 
determine sanctions to be applied.33 
 
The Court can render advisory opinions according to the Conventions art 64. This jurisdiction 
is very wide, and includes not only the convention but any treaty concerning the protection of 
human rights in the Americas, and can be requested by any member of OAS, not only those 
party to the Convention. The Court can further, in cases of extreme gravity or urgency, adopt 
                                                 
27 Convention, chapter VIII; González, p. 123.  
28 OAS, Statute of the IACtHR, Resolution No. 448, October 1979, art 3 and 4.  
29 IACtHR, Viviana Gallardo, para 25.  
30 Convention, art 61. 
31 IACtHR, Rules of Procedure of the IACtHR, approved November 2000, partially amended January 2009, art 
24; González, p. 120.  
32 Buergenthal, p. 298; IACtHR, Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, 2004, para 79.  
33 Convention art 73.  
  8   
 
provisional measures.34 This can be done to any case pending before the Court, or, by request 
from the Commission, to a case pending before the Commission.  
 
The jurisdiction of the Court is optional when ratifying the American Convention and a state 
can at any time declare that it recognizes its jurisdiction.35 So far, 20 of the 23 states members 
to the Convention have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court.36 
 
3 The principle of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies 
3.1 The principle in international law 
3.1.1 Short history  
According to Trindade, the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies dates back to as  
early as the ninth century, when states and sovereign territories settled matters between each 
other themselves. If an alien was injured or suffered loss in a state, he would ask his home 
state for help to regain what was lost. This could happen with diplomacy or with the notion of 
reprisals. Reprisals was a right given by the ruler to the wronged person to claim goods from 
any person from the injuring state, until the value of what was lost had been regained.37 With 
both reprisals and diplomatic intervention a principle developed, stating that before the home 
state would involve itself in the conflict, the person had to try to resolve the matter with the 
injuring state. Only if he failed to obtain justice in the appropriate courts would the home state 
consider the case, and if found just, intervene. Even exceptions to the rule were developed, 
similar to the ones we have today.38 
 
In international law, state practice has been reasonably clear throughout the years, developing 
and affirming the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies. The principle however does 
                                                 
34 Convention, art 63 (2).  
35 Convention, art 62.  
36 Reinsberg, p. 8.  
37 A A C Trindade, Origin and Historical Development of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in 
International Law, RBDI, No. 2 (1976), 499–527. 
38 Trindade, Origin, p. 517.  
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not apply in all contexts. If a dispute arises between two states, it does not come into play, as 
it would be hard to expect one states to take the conflict to the domestic remedies of the other 
state.  
 
Exhaustion of domestic remedies developed from the principle of non-intervention and state 
sovereignty, meaning that one state should not intervene in the matters of another state.39  
Only when ones nationals did not get justice could and should the national’s state step in to 
try to resolve the situation. In international law today, we have international bodies and courts 
for conflict resolution, but the principle remains the same.  
 
3.1.2 Reasons for the principle in international law 
There are many reasons for the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies, but one main 
reason is state sovereignty. In state sovereignty lies that each state has responsibility for what 
goes on in their own territory, and should be free from intervention from others. It gives the 
state a chance to address the alleged claim, if needed, make compensation for an injury, and 
thus avoiding international responsibility. Judge Córdova, supports state sovereignty by  
saying that the main reason for the existence of the principle of exhaustion of domestic  
remedies is “the indispensable necessity to harmonize the international and the national  
jurisdictions - assuring in this way the respect due to the sovereign jurisdiction of States”.40 
This is based on the assumption that the state is capable of administering justice and has 
available effective remedies to do so.41 
 
Judge Córdova also draws out another important reason for the rule in his statement, the  
necessity to harmonize international courts and bodies with domestic remedies. In  
international law international remedies have been made secondary to domestic remedies, 
meaning that the international mechanisms should come second, therefore after the domestic 
ones. Otherwise, there could easily be confusion as to where one should, and could, take ones 
case first. With the rule that international mechanisms are secondary it clarifies that one must 
                                                 
39 Trindade, Origin, p. 521 
40 International Court of Justice (ICJ), Case of Interhandel (United States of America v. Switzerland) Preliminary 
objections, separate opinion of Judge Cordova, 1959, p.45. 
41 ECtHR, Key case-law issues; Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, 2006, LVI, 1–5, para 4.  
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start at the domestic level, and only if justice is not obtained therein, can one take the case to 
the international level. In this way, the principle of exhaustion gives a certain order to the  
international procedure.42  
 
The principle is also based on the logic that when there is an available judicial remedy for the 
dispute to be resolved, it should be sought, and that foreigners are presumed to take into  
account the local law and means of addressing wrongs.43 
 
Every system has its limitations, and one reason for the principle of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies is based on this. International bodies and courts have limited time and resources, and 
if all cases from all countries could freely be filed, the international mechanisms would be 
quickly overwhelmed and overworked. By making cases go through domestic remedies first, 
a large number are solved there and the pressure on the international systems is reduced.  
 
Lastly, the principle tries to avoid unnecessary diplomatic conflict. In international law cases 
are between two, or more, states. One conflict can easily lead to further diplomatic disputes 
between the parties, and by forcing them to try to resolve it on the domestic level, the rule of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies tries to avoid the necessity of cases reaching the  
international level, and thereby limiting or altogether avoiding diplomatic disputes.44 
 
In short, there are numerous reasons for the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies. It 
protects state sovereignty, gives meaning to the secondary nature of international  
mechanisms, works to keep international mechanisms from being overwhelmed with cases, 
and tries to limit disputes between states.  
 
                                                 
42 Silvia D’ Ascoli and Kathrin Maria Scherr, The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Local Remedies in the 
International Law Doctrine and Its Application in the Specific Context of Human Rights Protection, EUI 
Working Papers, 2007. p. 9. 
43 Mr. John R. Dugard, Special Rapporteur, Doc A7CN.4/514, Second report on Diplomatic Protection, 2001, 
para 2, citing Borchard, The Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad or the Law of International Claims, 
pp. 817-818.  
44 ICJ, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), preliminary 
objections, 2007.  
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3.1.3 The principle as customary international law  
As seen in section 3.1.1, the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic remedies has a long and  
consistent history in international law. D’Ascoli and Scherr write that the principle with “its  
frequent application by international courts, its recognition in inter-state practice, and its  
extensive scholarly analysis allow for the assumption that the existence or general validity of 
the rule do not have to be questioned.”45 Trindade takes it further and states that “by the end 
of the nineteenth century, as the rule had become consistently relied upon by States in their 
frequent insistence on settlements within the framework of their own internal legal system, it 
became difficult to deny that it had gradually crystallized into a customary rule of  
international law, as undisputedly acknowledged by State practice nowadays.”46 
 
That the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies forms a part of current customary  
international law is supported by both literature47 and international cases. The two most  
important cases to mention are the Interhandel case48 and the ELSI case49 before the  
International Court of Justice (ICJ). In the Interhandel case the ICJ stated that the rule was “a 
well-established rule of customary international law”50 because it had been generally observed 
in cases. In the ELSI case the ICJ described the principle not only as a rule of customary law, 
but as “an important principle of customary international law”.51 There can therefore be no 
doubt that the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies is part of customary international 
law.  
 
 
                                                 
45 D’Ascoli and Scherr, p. 2.  
46 Trindade, Origin, p. 526 
47 ECtHR, Key case-law issues; Dugard; Jan Paulsson, Denial of Justice in International Law, Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2010, p. 102.  
48 Interhandel (United states of America vs Switzerland), preliminary objections, 1959. 
49 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (United States of America vs Italy), 1989, para 50.  
50 Interhandel, p. 27 
51 ELSI, para 50. 
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3.2 The principle in human rights law 
3.2.1 Short history  
The principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies used to apply only to the relationship  
between a state and foreigners, meaning nationals fell outside its scope.52 However, as  
international law came to recognize the individual as a subject, with rights and duties during 
the 20th century,53 the principle grew accordingly, including nationals in dispute with their 
own state. It has been debated whether the principle grew from diplomatic protection, became 
a separate object or absorbed diplomatic protection.54 This is outside of this thesis and will not 
be discussed. The important for the subject of this thesis is that when human rights developed 
in its current form, the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies was included. 
 
With the first attempts of codification of human rights in international treaties, the principle of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies was not included,55 except for the Central American Court 
of Justice.56 But, when new attempts were made at international human rights conventions 
after the Second World War, with the ICCPR and the ECHR, the rule of exhaustion of  
domestic remedies was debated in length in the preparatory works with regards to the  
possibility of individual complaints.57  
 
 
 
                                                 
52 Trindade, Origin, p. 525 
53 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1994; Kate Parlett, The Individual and Structural Change in the International Legal System, 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (1)3: 60–80, 2012; Rhona Smith, Textbook on 
International Human Rights, Oxford University press, fifth edition, 2012.  
54Anna Maria Helena Vermeer-Künzli, The Protection of Individuals by means of Diplomatic Protection: Dip-
lomatic Protection as a Human Rights Instrument, PrintPartners Ipskamp, 2007.  
55 Trindade, A.A.C, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law - Its 
rationale in the international protection of individual rights, Cambridge University Press, 1983, p. 2.  
56 Convention for the Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, 1907, art 2.  
57 Trindade, The Application, p. 3.  
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From being a principle for foreigners in conflict with another state, it now includes every  
individual in dispute with any state. Today the principle has an important place in human 
rights law, and is a part of all major international and regional human rights instruments,  
including CAT, ICCPR (in the First Optional Protocol), ECHR, CERD, ACHPR and ACHR. 
“Although the wording of exhaustion provisions in these treaties varies, their interpretations 
are substantially similar.”58  
 
3.2.2 Reasons for the principle in human rights  
The reasons for the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies are mostly the same 
throughout the different human rights conventions. Three of the reasons mentioned under 
general international law are the same under human rights law; to harmonize domestic and 
international processes, limit the number of cases at the international or regional level as to 
not overwhelm the systems and the principle that international or regional scrutiny is  
secondary to the domestic level. For the first two of these reasons, what is written above is the 
same under human rights law, and will not be repeated. But, when it comes to the secondary, 
or complementary, nature of international review of a case, some extra considerations must be 
taken into account when dealing with human rights.  
 
Human rights is an area of international law with separate and sometimes different interests 
and situations from those for which the rule was originally intended, meaning some interest 
must weigh different in human rights law than in general international law. In the area of  
diplomatic protection, the main interest to protect is the state sovereignty. In human rights 
however, the main interest is the individual and the human rights of individuals. This means 
that in human rights law there is a clear competition of interests between the state, who wishes 
to protect its sovereignty, and the individual, who wishes to have the alleged wrong remedied 
quickly and efficiently. According to D’Ascoli and Sherr, it is therefore not convincing to 
apply the rule in the same form and meaning for the fields of diplomatic protection and  
human rights, as they are based on different perspectives and premises.59  
 
                                                 
58 Donna J Sullivan, Overview of the Rule Requiring the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies under the Optional 
Protocol to CEDAW, OP-CEDAW Technical Papers No. 1, 2008. p. 1. 
59 D’Ascoli and Scherr, p. 17 
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These two competing interests must be weighed against each other. If the principle is applied 
too strictly, it might be used “to over-protect the interests of the State at the expense of the 
protection of the individual.”60 It is important to remember that the reason for the international 
and regional instruments is the protection and promotion of human rights. The conventions 
must therefore be interpreted as to realise this aim.61 Without the existing exceptions to the 
rule, the government could easily stall domestic remedies, making international access to the 
case impossible. And, “the rule of prior exhaustion must never lead to a halt or delay that 
would render international action in support of the defenceless victim ineffective.”62 
 
If, on the other hand, there was no principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies, then respect 
for state sovereignty would be lost, and the state would in some cases loose the chance to 
remedy the situation on its own. That is, assuming the state is able to provide effective  
remedies to the alleged wrong. Human rights treaties are built on the assumption that each 
state will and can remedy its own mistakes.63 This is why the international system is  
secondary. It is there to rectify when the state commits violations, and to check that the  
remedies in each state fulfil the requirements on domestic remedies in the treaty concerning 
access to justice. In a way, the exhaustion rule helps international bodies check whether the 
state is upholding its duty of having an effective judicial system, able to rectify human rights 
breaches.64 
 
The balance between the interests of the state and those of the individual is an important  
reason for the rule, and its flexible application in human rights law.65 Another reason for the 
principle is that domestic remedies are often cheaper, more accessible and quicker than  
international remedies, an important feature as victims of human rights violations are often 
without many resources and wish to resolve their claims as quickly as possible. This along 
with the need for limiting cases at the international level and the need to harmonize between 
                                                 
60 D’Ascoli and Scherr, p. 8.  
61 ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, Application no 2122/64, 1968; United Nations General Assembly, Vienna 
Convention on the law of treaties (VCLT), 1969, art 31.  
62 IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez, preliminary objections, para 93.  
63 A.A.C. Trindade, The Access of Individuals to International Justice, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 99.  
64 ECtHR, Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 21893/93, 1996. para 65.  
65 See below section 4.1. 
  15   
 
domestic and international remedies make up the reason for the principle of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies in human rights law.  
 
3.3 Substantial rule or rule of procedure? 
3.3.1 The three positions 
In international law, there has been much dispute over the nature of the principle of  
exhaustion of domestic remedies, over what type of rule it is, whether it is a rule of substance, 
a procedural prerequisite for admissibility, or both.66 The question is from which moment 
international responsibility is generated. This dispute has enjoyed much attention and  
discussion, with different scholars taking different positions. In this thesis, only a summary of 
the different alternatives will be presented.  
 
There are three positions in the discussion. The first is that it is a rule of substance, meaning 
that the international responsibility for the wrongful act does not occur until local remedies 
have been exhausted without success.67 The second position is that the principle is one of  
procedure, simply a barrier for admissibility, and international responsibility is generated at 
the moment of the incident giving basis for the claim, before trying domestic remedies. 68  
 
According to special rapporteur for the International Law Commission, Mr. John Dugard, a 
third alternative has emerged.69 This third option distinguishes between an injury under do-
mestic and international law. For an injury under only domestic law, then the principle is one 
of substance, and international responsibility occurs with denial of justice. If the injury on the 
other hand, also is a breach of international law, then international responsibility occurs  
                                                 
66 Scherr and D’Ascoli; Dugard.  
67 Dugard, para 32; Judge Morelli’s dissenting opinion in Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction, Light and 
Power Company Limited, Preliminary Objections, Belgium vs. Spain, 1970, p. 114; Judge Hudson’s dissent-
ing opinion in Panevezys-Saldutikis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania), Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) Series A/B, No. 76, 1939, para 181. 
68 Scherr and D’Ascoli p.4; Dugard, para 32; dissenting opinion of Judge Armand-Ugon, Interhandel case, ICJ, 
1959, p. 88; dissenting opinion of Judge Tanaka, The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Lim-
ited, ICJ Reports 1970 p. 143; PCIJ, Phosphates in Morocco Case (France vs Italy), Series A/B, No. 74 
(1938), para 48.  
69 Dugard, para 32.   
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immediately with the injury, and exhaustion of domestic remedies is merely a procedural  
precondition.70 In this position the nature of the rule depends on the law it breaches, domestic 
or international.  
 
No conclusion to the discussion of whether the violation of exhaustion of domestic remedies 
is of procedural or substantive nature exists. As Dugard states, most attempts of codification 
of the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies avoid a clear commitment to either or, and 
state practice is unreliable as states tend to advocate the nature which would serve their views 
in the relevant case.71 Still, there are some signs that the procedural nature is favoured, at least 
with the ICJ, as “no ICJ decision gives support to the view that the local remedies rule is  
substantive in nature. While clear judicial support for the procedural view is not forthcoming 
either, there are some signs that this approach is preferred.”72 
 
3.3.2 The position of the rule in human rights law  
The discussion about the nature of the rule also exists in human rights law. Although no clear 
answer exists, there seems to be many indications that the rule as procedural is preferred.73  
 
The first indication is the texts of human rights conventions, which place the principle of  
exhaustion of domestic remedies under considerations for admissibility.74 Secondly, all  
international human rights bodies deal with the claim of non-exhaustion as a preliminary  
objection, when considering the admissibility of a case. If the rule was substantive, then the 
violation and failure of justice would be the same issue, and should be dealt with together. If 
the rule is procedural however, the issues are separate, exhaustion only important for  
admissibility, and should logically be dealt with first, as is done in practice.75  
                                                 
70 Dugard, para. 32.  
71 For example did Italy rely strongly on the substantive approach in the Phosphates in Morocco case, while 50 
years later, in the ELSI case, suddenly argued that it was a procedural rule.  
72Dugard, para. 49.  
73 ECtHR cases: Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 5310/71, 1978, para. 9; Foti and others vs Italy, 
Application no. 7604/76; 7719/76; 7781/77; 7913/77, 1982; Zimmerman and Steiner vs Switzerland, Appli-
cation no. 8737/79, 1983. 
74 ECHR art. 35; ACHR art. 46 
75 IACtHR, Chocrón Chocrón vs Venezuela, 2011.  
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The IACtHR also showed support for the procedural nature of the rule in the Velásquez 
Rodríguez case.76 Here the Court stated that when exceptions were invoked, not only was the 
petitioner excused from exhausting domestic remedies, but the state was also indirectly 
charged with a new, additional violation. If having an ineffective judicial system is a new  
offence of the state, than the alleged violation is a violation on its own, and was considered 
such before trying domestic remedies.  
 
For one prominent scholar, Trindade, there is no doubt, in human rights “the rule has clearly 
operated as a dilatory objection or temporal bar of a procedural nature.”77 
 
3.4 The consequence of non-fulfilment of the principle in the 
Inter-American system of human rights 
In the Inter-American system of human rights, the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is 
one of admissibility. “Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention provides that a petition’s 
admissibility depends directly on whether the available remedies under a State’s domestic 
laws have been pursued and exhausted.”78 Unless one of the exceptions in paragraph two of 
art. 46 is applicable,79 art 47 states that the Commission shall consider the petition  
inadmissible.  
 
This means that where the domestic remedies are not exhausted, and no exception is  
applicable, the case shall be rejected and no consideration of the merits shall be done. This is 
why the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is so important to understand for the  
petitioners pledging their case, and the Commission and Court considering the case. 
 
                                                 
76 Preliminary objections, para 91.  
77 Trindade, Origin, p. 526.  
78 IACmHR, Marcela Andrea Valdez Diaz vs Chile, Report No. 57/03, petition 12.337, 2003, para 39. 
79 The three exceptions to the rule in the Inter-American system are as mentioned; where there is no remedy, no 
access to a remedy or there has been an excessive delay in rendering a final judgement. 
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4 Application of exhaustion of domestic 
remedies in Inter-American human rights law 
4.1 Strict or flexible application? 
Trindade is a prominent voice for a flexible application and interpretation of the rule.80 He 
compares the underlying differences between diplomatic and human rights protection and 
states that “a less rigorous and more realistic application of the rule (…) would seem  
appropriate”81 in human rights law. He further claims that “there are sufficient elements (…) 
warranting a flexible application.”82 Trindade believes that much of the general critique of the 
principle is based on its rigid application.83  
 
Sullivan also voices support for a flexible application, and states that jurisprudence from  
human rights bodies and courts indicate a flexible use.84 This, she writes, is a consequence of 
the fact that each case is examined on the circumstances in the case. 85 By not having a strict 
application, and rather apply the principle according to the facts of the case, it gives  
recognition of the underlying purpose of the rule, which is to find a balance between giving 
states an opportunity to solve the matter on its own and providing effective redress for alleged 
victims. Sullivan thus claims that a flexible application and interpretation of the principle, 
rather than a strict one, is better in accordance with the purposes of the principle in human 
rights law, and the human rights treaties.  
 
The Inter-American Court also voices support for a flexible application. In the Velásquez 
Rodríguez case it states that “A norm is meant to have an effect and should not be interpreted 
in such a way as to negate its effect or lead to a result that is manifestly absurd or  
                                                 
80 As well as former president of the IACtHR, professor in international law and current judge the ICJ.  
81 Trindade, The Application. p. 52 
82 Ibid. p. 53 
83 Ibid p. 48. See also Trindade, The Access, p. 103.  
84 ECtHR, Ringeisen v. Austria, merits, Application no. 2614/65, 1971, para 89. ECtHR, Akdivar and others v. 
Turkey, para 69.  
85 Sullivan, p. 28.  
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unreasonable.”86 A strict application could easily lead to unwanted and unjust results, giving 
the state an unfair opportunity to exploit the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies. By 
rather focusing on the purpose of the principle, the Inter-American Court seeks to find a result 
that seems in line with the object and purpose of the Convention.87  
 
4.1.1 The case-by-case approach 
A flexible application is often expressed as a case-by-case approach, where the application of 
the principle depends on the circumstances of each case. Since no two cases are alike, the 
application of the principle should not automatically be the same. Each case needs to be  
examined on its own, with the facts and circumstances of the specific case compared with the 
purpose of the principle.  
 
Paulsson voices support for this approach, and states that whether a remedy is available needs 
to be determined on a case-by-case basis.88 The Court has stated that it must examine an issue 
in its specific context,89 meaning that an approach taken in one case might not be the same in 
the next. An example of this is found in Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v. Honduras. Here 
the Court stated that the conduct of the state normally would imply a waiver of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, but that one must not rule without taking into account the specific  
circumstances of the case.90 This implies a flexible and case-by-case application of the  
principle, to best realize distribution of justice in the individual case, not just in general. 
 
Another example of this is which remedies that have been seen as available and effective. In  
Velasquez Rodriguez (merits), the Court considered remedies to be unavailable and ineffec-
tive even though they existed in theory, based on the specific circumstances of the case. The 
case concerned enforced disappearances, for which the Court considered the remedies would 
                                                 
86 Merits, para 64. See also IACtHR Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v . Honduras, merits, 1989, para 88. 
87 See VCLT, art 31.  
88 Paulsson, p. 116.  
89 IACtHR, Godínez-Cruz v. Honduras, preliminary objections, 1987, para 86; IACmHR, Alicia Alvarez 
Trinidad v. Peru, Report No. 5/10, petition 12.118, 2010, para 29; IACmHR, María Mercedes Zapata Parra v. 
Peru, Report No. 45/09, petition 12.079, 2009, para 34; IACmHR, Ciro Abdías Bodero Arellano v. Peru, Report 
No. 44/09, petition 12.161, 2009, para 28.  
90 Preliminary objections, para 89.  
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have no effect, but it was not said that they would be without effect in general. The Court 
considered them in the specific context, not in general.  Similarly, in the case of Durand and 
Ugarte v. Peru91 the Court held that one remedy, although not generally deemed ineffective or 
unavailable, was not suitable in the specific circumstances of the case, as it was not suited to 
achieve what was sought in the case.  
 
Lastly, support for the case-by-case application is found in an advisory opinion.92 Here the 
Court states that whether one is exempt from exhausting domestic remedies, depends on the 
circumstances of the case. The fact that a petitioner is for example indigent will not  
automatically make him or her exempt from exhaustion, it will depend on the case.93  
 
4.1.2 Summary 
There is much support from both literature and jurisprudence for a flexible and case-specific 
application of the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies in human rights, to best  
realize the purpose of the principle.94 As Sir Hersch Lauterpacht has stated, the rule of  
exhaustion of domestic remedies is not purely technical, but one which has been applied with 
considerable elasticity.95 
  
4.2 What is a “domestic remedy” that needs to be exhausted? 
“Article 46(1)(a) of the American Convention provides that a petition’s admissibility depends 
directly on whether the available remedies under a State’s domestic laws have been pursued 
and exhausted”.96 So what are the remedies included in the term “domestic remedies”, making 
them obligatory to pursue and exhaust?  
 
 
                                                 
91 Preliminary objections, 1999. 
92 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-11 / 90 Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies ( Art . 46 ( 1 ), 
46 ( 2 )( a ) and 46 ( 2 )( b ) American Convention on Human Rights), 1990.  
93 Ibid. para 19 and 20.  
94 D’Ascoli and Scherr, p. 15.  
95 ICJ, Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, 1957, p. 39.  
96 IACmHR, Valdez Diaz vs Chile, para 39.  
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Generally, remedies have been divided into three categories; judicial, administrative and  
extraordinary remedies. Sullivan says which remedies must be exhausted, is evaluated on a 
case-by-case basis.97 What must be exhausted in one case, might not need be exhausted in 
another. It is the ordinary means of obtaining justice in that domestic system, for that type of 
injustice that needs to be exhausted.98 What this is, depends on the state concerned and which 
remedies it has for obtaining justice and if they are available, adequate and effective.99 As the 
IACtHR puts it, “a number of remedies exist in the legal system of every country, but not all 
are applicable in every circumstance.”100 
 
It is therefore hard to say with certainty what remedies are obligatory to exhaust in a  
particular case and which are not, but as Pasqualucci writes, “the Court has been able to  
articulate a few general principles that allow for more certainty as to the remedies that need or 
need not be exhausted in the case.”101 Decisive is whether the remedy is an adequate and  
effective remedy in the specific case, that is whether it is suitable to address an infringement 
of a legal right and capable of producing a result resolving the alleged wrong.102  
 
4.2.1 Judicial remedies 
The IACmHR restated in Escher vs. Brazil that one was not required to exhaust all remedies 
available under domestic law, but rather that if the petitioner tries to resolve the matter by 
using a valid, judicial remedy, and the state had an opportunity to remedy the issue, then the 
purpose of the principle was fulfilled.103 This means that, the exhaustion rule is interpreted to 
                                                 
97 Sullivan, p. 3.  
98 Paulsson, p. 112.  
99 See below section 4.6.  
100 IACtHR, Velazques Rodriguez, para 64. IACtHR Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v . Honduras, merits, para 
88. 
101 Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Cambridge 
University Press, Second edition, 2013, p. 96.  
102 IACtHR, Velasquez Rodríguez, merits, para 64 and 66.  
103 Report no. 18/06, petition 12.353, 2006, para 28. See also IACmHR cases; Valdez Diaz vs Chile, para 40; 
Naranjo Cardenas vs Venezuela, Report no. 70/04, petition 667/01, 2004, para 52 and Rolando Ernesto Gó-
mez García and Bernarda Liliana Gómez García v. Honduras, Report No. 121/12, petition 764-03, 2012, 
para 25.  
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refer principally to ordinary judicial remedies.104 This is because judicial remedies are seen as 
the most effective means of addressing a violation of legal rights.105 
 
It is the normal judicial recourse for the type of case concerned that must be used, which  
normally is taking the case up through the domestic court system, from the first, all the way 
up to the highest court. How far the case needs to be taken, is however also a consideration of 
their ability of effect.106 For example in Escher vs. Brazil the petitioners were not required to 
take the case to the Supreme Court, as it would have no possibility of stopping the alleged 
violation.  
 
Exhaustion of legal remedies includes both civil and criminal proceedings,107 but not always 
both in the same case. For example have the Court and Commission numerous times stated 
that if the alleged breach is a criminal act, the responsibility is on the state to investigate, and 
a civil suit is not an adequate remedy for the violation, and need not be pursued.108 The  
important question is whether the judicial remedy is capable to “directly repair the harm, hold 
the state accountable, or require the State to provide reparation”109 If it is not, then it is not a 
remedy one need to exhaust.  
 
In many Latin-American countries,110 a common civil law procedure is amparo, analogue to 
habeas corpus. This is a form of constitutional relief, a complaint a person can file claiming a 
government agency is violating a constitutionally protected human right. It is a simple,  
                                                 
104 Sullivan, p. 4. See also Reinsberg, p. 17.  
105 Sullivan, p. 4, see also Dugard, para 12; “There is strong support for the view that all legal remedies that offer 
the injured individual a prospect of success must be exhausted.” 
106 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion, para 36; IACtHR, Velásquez Rodríguez, para 63; IACmHR, Santos Soto Ramí-
rez et al., Mexico, Report No. 68/01, petition 12,117, 2001, para 14; IACmHR, Zulema Tarazona Arriate et 
al., Peru, Report No. 83/01, petition 11,581, 2001, para 24; IACmHR Valdez Diaz vs Chile, para 41. 
107 Reinsberg, p. 17.  
108 Pasqualucci, p. 96. See also IACmHR, Cañas Cano et al. v. Colombia, Report No. 75/03, petition 42/02, 
2003, para 27-28; IACmHR, Márcia Cristina Rigo Leopoldi v. Brazil, Report No. 9/12, petition 11.996, 2012, 
para 27; IACtHR, Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v. Honduras, merits, para 110, IACmHR, Arges Sequeira 
Mangas v. Nicaragua, Report No. 52/97, petition 11.218, 1998, para 96.  
109 Reinsberg, p. 17.  
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inexpensive remedy, available to everyone, often not requiring legal counsel.111 According to 
the Court, this procedure has the necessary characteristics for protecting human rights, and 
has generally been accepted as a remedy one is obligated to exhaust.112 
 
In short, all judicial remedies that are capable of redress must be exhausted. When dealing 
with other types of remedies however, like administrative and extraordinary ones, the matter 
gets more uncertain. The important aspect of both these types of remedies, is however also 
their ability to efficiently and fully remedy the alleged violation.  
 
4.2.2 Administrative remedies 
The first question is whether administrative remedies are included in general. Support for 
their inclusion has been stated by Dugard113 and Reinsberg,114 and the HRC stated in Brough 
v. Australia115 that the term “domestic remedies” not only includes judicial remedies, but also 
administrative ones.116 Support for acceptance in general is also found in Reyes v. Chile.117 
Although the suggested administrative remedy was not accepted, this was because it was not 
adequate or effective in that case. The Commission gives specific reasons for why the  
administrative remedy was not applicable in the case, and does not reject administrative  
                                                                                                                                                        
110 Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guate-
mala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela, according to Gloria 
Orrego Hoyos, The Amparo Context in Latin American Jurisdiction: an approach to an empowering action, 
April 2013.  
111 Hoyos.  
112 Pasqualucci, p. 97; IACmHR, Ojo de Agua v. Mexico, Report No. 73/99, petition 11.701, 1999, para 17; 
IACmHR, Naranjo Cardenas vs Venezuela, para 53; IACmHR, Colmenares Castillo vs Mexico, Report No, 
36/05, petition 12.170, 2005, para 33. 
113 Dugard, para 14.  
114 Reinsberg, p. 13.  
115 Communication No. 1184/2003, 2006 para 8.6.  
116 See also Trindade, The Applicaton, p. 61 
117 IACmHR, Report No. 60/03, petition 12.108, 2003, para 51. See also IACmHR, Jorge Teobaldo Pinzas 
Salazar vs Peru, report 107/06, petition 12.318, 2006, para 28 and IACmHR, José Adrián Mejía Mendoza et 
al. v. El Salvador, Report No. 119/12, petition 185-03, 2012, para 33. 
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remedies as a whole. If the Commission meant that administrative remedies as a whole were 
excluded it would have been easier to state that, rather than find specific reasons as to why it 
was not applicable in the specific case. This shows support for a general inclusion of  
administrative remedies as remedies that must be exhausted to fulfil the principle of  
exhaustion of domestic remedies.  
 
The question is what types of administrative remedies are included? This is again decided by 
whether a remedy is available, adequate and effective.118 It depends on a number of factors 
like the bodies independence, if the decisions are enforceable, if the proceedings give a due 
process of law and if the remedies it gives are adequate and correct for the circumstances of 
the particular case and relief sought.119 Trindade writes that administrative remedies that are 
judicial in nature fall within the remedies that must be exhausted, whilst administrative  
remedies, and other remedies, that are of a non-judicial character, fall outside the scope of the 
principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies.120 
 
An example of an administrative remedy that has been much discussed but rarely accepted is 
national human rights commissions or ombudsmen.121 In both Colmenares Castillo v. Mexico 
and Ojo de Agua v. Mexico the Commission stated that the remedy was not a suitable one for 
the violations in question,122 and the petitioners were not required to exhaust it. In Lara  
Preciado v. Mexico123 the ombudsman in Mexico was described as a quasi-judicial body that 
issues recommendations, they have moral value but are non-enforceable. Any remedy that is 
not enforceable is not effective,124 and once again the remedy of ombudsmen was exempt 
from exhaustion.  
                                                 
118 Sullivan, p. 5; IACmHR, Juan Echeverría Manzo and Mauricio Espinoza González v Chile, Report no. 
108/13, petition 4636-02, 2013, para 51. 
119 Sullivan, p. 5. See also IACtHR cases: 19 Merchants v. Colombia, merits, 2004, para 192; Baena-Ricardo et 
al (270 workers) v. Panama, competence, 2003, para. 77; “Five Pensioners” v. Peru, merits, 2003, para. 126; 
Las Palmeras v. Colombia, merits, 2001, para. 58. 
120 Trindade, The Application, p. 62.  
121 HRC, Brough v. Australia, para 8.7.  
122 Delay in judicial proceedings and disappearances of people 
123 IACmHR, Report No. 45/96, petition 11.492, 1996, para 24.  
124 IACtHR, Acevedo-Jaramillo et al. v. Peru, 2006, para 220. 
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If an administrative remedy has previously been shown effective by others, it will generally 
be accepted.125 This even if the remedy was not successful for the plaintiff, if this is due to 
wrong or untimely use, or other reasons that cannot be attributed to the state.126 Similarly, if a 
remedy has previously been shown ineffective, this will generally be upheld.127 Using  
administrative remedies instead of judicial ones, or ineffective ones instead of available  
effective ones cannot fulfil nor excuse the exhaustion principle.128 Neither will refusal to use 
judicial remedies, in favour of administrative ones, because of the costs involved.129  
 
In sum, administrative remedies are accepted as a part of “domestic remedies” that need to be 
exhausted when they are adequate and effective, and have the possibility to give appropriate 
relief to the alleged violation. They cannot however take the place of judicial remedies, which 
will need to be exhausted also, unless they are exempt.130 
 
4.2.3 Extraordinary remedies 
The last question is, what about those remedies that are neither judicial, nor administrative? 
Such remedies have been categorized as extraordinary remedies, and include all remedies a 
state has, that are not ordinary judicial or administrative ones. A wide array is possible, all 
from presidential pardons, to challenges of the legality or constitutionality of a law. “The 
[case-law] of the [Inter-American human rights] system has established that while in some 
cases such extraordinary remedies may be suitable for addressing human rights violations, as 
a general rule the only remedies that need be exhausted are those whose function within the 
                                                 
125 IACmHR, Luis Edgar Vera  Flores v. Peru, Report No. 86/05, petition 4416-02, 2005.  
126 IACmHR, Salazar v. Peru.  
127 IACmHR, José Maria Guimarães v. Brazil, Report No. 60/13, petition 1242-07, 2013, para 16. 
128 IACmHR, Colmenares Castillo v. Mexico; CtAT, A.H. v. Sweden, Communication No. 250/2004, 2006, para 
4.10; HRC, P.S. v. Denmark, Communication No. 397/1990, 1992, para 5.4. 
129 HRC, R.T. v. France, Communication No. 262/1987, 1989, para 7.4. See also IACtHR Advisory Opinion; 
IACmHR, Alicia Alvarez Trinidad v. Peru, para 29.  
130 IACmHR, La Granja, Ituango vs Colombia, Report 57/00, Petition 12.050, 2000. 
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domestic legal system is appropriate for providing protection to remedy an infringement of a 
given legal right.  In principle, these are ordinary rather than extraordinary remedies.”131 
 
As with the previous categories, it is not their categorization as “extraordinary” rather than 
“ordinary” that decides if they are applicable, but whether they can offer an effective and  
sufficient means of remedying the violation.132 This means again a case-by-case assessment, 
but some general tendencies have emerged. For example has the Commission stated that in 
criminal proceedings, only ordinary remedies are required exhausted.133 
 
One category are those dependent on discretion. This can be presidential pardons, or  
intervention by an organisation or the community. Here the decision-maker is not obliged to 
act, nor to act impartially, and rules of a fair procedure does not apply. In short, the decision 
does not depend on legal principles, but rather the grace of the decision maker. Such a remedy 
cannot be expected to be exhausted, as their chance of success is unpredictable and follow no 
legal standard, their purpose is to obtain a favour and not to vindicate a right.134 
 
Another category are those that challenge the constitutionality or legality of a law. This would 
be a way of changing the law and then possibly change the outcome of ones claim. According 
to Pasqualucci one is not required to challenge the constitutionality of a law, when the remedy 
sought is a review of a judgment.135 A constitutional challenge of a law would normally  
follow a judgment one was unsatisfied with, and would therefore usually be to review a 
judgment, meaning one would rarely need to take steps to exhaust this remedy.136 
 
                                                 
131 IACmHR, Domínguez Domenichetti v. Argentina, Report No. 51/03, petition 11.819, 2003, para 45. See also 
IACmHR, Víctor Eladio Lara Bolívar v. Peru, Report No. 18/11, petition 871-03, 2011, para 27. 
132 Trindade, The Application, p. 90.  
133 IACmHR, Marcelo Sánchez Mourazos v Argentina, Report No. 157/10, petition 696-03, 2010, para 40. 
134 Dugard, para 14. See also Trindade, The Application, p. 62; European Commission on Human Rights 
(ECmHR), Fadele Emanuel, Fadele Kehinde, Fadele Taiwo, Fadele Victor v. United Kingdom, Application 
No. 13078/87, 1990. 
135 Pasqualucci, p. 97 
136 IACtHR, Herrera Ulloa v. Costa Rica, preliminary objections, para 85 
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In general extraordinary remedies are just that, extraordinary, and as Paulsson writes, one is 
not required to exhaust improbable remedies, nor those that go beyond the ordinary path of 
rectifying a wrong within a state.137 The point of the rule is to give the state a chance to rectify 
the wrong at the national level, but this should not mean that an individual needs to go above 
and beyond to try and exhaust every probable and improbable remedy that might potentially 
exist in a state.138 
 
4.3 How to exhaust domestic remedies 
The above section discusses which remedies are included in the exhaustion principle. The 
next question to clarify the scope of the principle is how one exhausts a remedy. The word 
“exhaust” implies that the remedy should be fully used, having tried all its possibilities,  
leaving nothing. The Commission and Court, as well as the other human rights bodies, have 
further clarified this in a rather consistent case law.  
 
4.3.1 Normal use of the remedy 
One should use a remedy in its normal way.139 This includes complying with procedural  
requirements, such as time limits, representation, fees etc.,140 as long as they are reasonable.141 
Failure to exhaust a remedy due to procedural faults by oneself or ones counsel will not  
absolve from failure of exhaustion.142 Where the state provides counsel, the council is  
assumed adequately equipped for the job, and if not, this issue should be raised at an  
appropriate time by the petitioner.143 If an applicant is expected to exhaust domestic remedies, 
he or she is also expected to do so properly. If such was not the case it would be the simplest 
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way out, and would result in the state not being afforded the benefit the rule gives; to review 
the matter on its own first. Over time the rule would lose its point, as all petitioners would 
commit a procedural error, and be freed from exhausting domestic remedies.  
 
One example of this is found in Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v. Honduras,144 where the 
Court stated that an unfavourable result, because the petitioner had not invoked the domestic 
remedy in a timely fashion, did not in itself demonstrate that the remedy was ineffective or 
unavailable.  
 
The petitioner is expected to pursue domestic remedies in a timely fashion, and comply with 
procedural requirements.145 Only if the state is somehow responsible for the procedural  
difficulties, or procedural requirements were unreasonable or otherwise inaccessible in the 
particular case can the petitioner be absolved from exhausting the remedy.146 Examples of this 
is can be where letters are not sent on time causing deadlines to expire, or faulty information 
comes from otherwise reliable government offices.  
 
4.3.2 Final decision 
Petitioners are further required to have a final decision from the domestic legal system.  
Within a domestic system, there is a system of review of decisions. They are set up in  
different levels so that the higher can supervise the lower, and rectify when they make  
mistakes, as they normally have the power to change or nullify a lower court’s decisions.147 
One purpose of the principle is that a state should have a chance to rectify the situation itself, 
and the requirement of a final decision helps give meaning to this purpose. Therefore,  
petitioners are required to take their cases through the entire domestic judicial system. 
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The requirement of a final decision can also be seen by the Conventions art 46(2)(c), that 
claims an exception from exhaustion when there has been an unwarranted delay in rendering a 
final decision, and art 46(1)(b) that states that a petitioner must lodge its complaint within 6 
months of the final decision. This shows that an applicant must have a final decision, not just 
any decision from the domestic system. 
 
With petitioners required to take their case to the highest possible Court of the state it means 
that they are required to appeal an unfavourable judgment all the way to the top.148 If an  
appeal is denied, it has reached its final judgement. If there are several claims joined in one 
case, all must be taken to the highest possible level.149 This however only applies as long as 
the appellant remedy is available, adequate and effective.150  
 
4.3.3 Substance of the claim 
For the state to be given a chance to rectify the violation itself, the situation claimed before 
the IACmHR or IACtHR must be the same that was brought before the domestic system.151 If 
it is not the same, or the claimant has not alleged the violation before the domestic courts, the 
state has not had a chance to remedy the situation, and domestic remedies have not been  
utilized and exhausted.152  
 
This does not however mean that the claim before the regional bodies must be identical to the 
one before domestic courts. According to Sullivan, it must be considered whether the  
substance of the claim is the same as the one raised at the domestic level. The important  
question is whether the state, at the domestic level, had a chance to address the essence of the 
situation and violations that are now at the regional level.153 It is not necessary to have  
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articulated the claim as a violation on human rights, nor having articulated which articles of 
the Convention the alleged breach concerns.154 Neither, is it required that the domestic system 
dealt with the claims, what is important is that they were brought forward, and that the  
petitioner gave the state a chance to address them.155 
 
4.4 Time aspects and waivers 
4.4.1 When must domestic remedies be exhausted? 
Exhaustion of domestic remedies is not only a question of actually exhausting such remedies, 
but also exhausting them at the right time. The Convention art 46(1) states that admission of a 
petition depends on that domestic remedies “have been” pursued and exhausted. This means 
that the remedies must have been exhausted before the case is brought before the  
Commission.  
 
Pasqualucci points out that the Commission cannot consider the case until domestic remedies 
have been exhausted, meaning that procedures before domestic courts etc. are finished. But it 
does not mean that they have to be exhausted at the time of filing a complaint.156 “If the 
Commission receives a petition before domestic remedies have been exhausted, it may not 
begin consideration of the matter. It may, however, hold the petition until the final judgment 
is made in the State and then process it.”157 This is illustrated by the case Castillo Petruzzi et 
al. v. Peru,158 where the case was filed before the final judgment of the military tribunal. The 
Court rejected the states preliminary objection of failure of exhaustion of domestic remedies, 
because the Commission had not acted on the case until after the final judgment in Peru. One 
should not confuse the receipt of a case with its admission and processing, and only with the 
last, must domestic remedies be exhausted.159 
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This position takes into account practical considerations of the system, and makes it less  
formalistic, to not discourage petitioners from using it.160 Although one should not count on 
the Commission to hold the petition for a long time without processing it whilst one exhausts 
domestic remedies, it gives the Commission the possibility of holding a case that is soon  
finished, instead of dismissing it and forcing the petitioner to re-lodge it shortly after.  In a 
system that sometimes can draw out in time, this can be a positive contribution to potentially 
save time and effort for the petitioners.  
 
4.4.2 The claim of non-exhaustion and waivers of the exhaustion 
requirement 
4.4.2.1 Specific, timely claims and its effects if not completed 
Non-exhaustion must be raised by the state in specific terms, listing available remedies, and 
give reports of their availability, adequacy and effectiveness.161 A general reference to  
non-exhaustion is not enough.162 
 
The state must further raise the claim of non-exhaustion in a timely manner, at a procedurally 
correct moment. According to the Court in Chocrón Chocrón v. Venezuela, exhaustion of 
domestic remedies is a defence available to the state, and therefore the procedural moment of 
objection is important. “If the objection is not presented during the admissibility proceedings 
before the Commission, the State will have forfeited the possibility of using this means of 
defence before the Court.”163 When the claim of non-exhaustion is not raised at the  
appropriate time, the possibility of raising it is lost, because the Commission and Court will 
view the state’s silence as a tacit waiver of the principle.164 This has been the jurisprudence of 
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the Commission and Court for over 20 years, and the procedural deadline is in accordance 
with international law, and particularly ECtHR practice.165 
 
In several cases, the state has failed to raise the objection at the appropriate time, in some  
cases as late as when the case reached the Court. For example in Gomes Lund v. Brazil, the 
objection was first raised more than 9 years after the Commission ruled on admissibility of 
the case. In other cases the objection first appeared long into the case, and was therefore  
rejected with the statements that the objections should have been interjected at an earlier stage 
and more clearly.166 As the Court has stated several times, “it does not fall to the international 
organs to rectify the lack of precision in the States arguments.”167 
 
4.4.2.2 More about waivers of the exhaustion requirement 
According to the above subsection, the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies can be 
presumed waived by the state. The principle can also be expressly waived, as there is a long 
established practice of this practice in international law.168 According to the Court, the  
principle exists for the benefit of the state, as a means of defence, and can therefore be waived 
by the state, even tacitly.169 A waiver once in effect though, cannot be revoked.170  
 
The Commission stated in Abu-Ali Abdur Rahman v. USA that once faced with an irrevocable 
waiver “the Commission is not obliged to consider any potential bars to the admissibility of a 
petitioner’s claims that might have properly been raised by a state relating to the exhaustion of 
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domestic remedies”.171 A waiver, expressly given or tacitly implied, therefore comes with the 
great consequence that a petition can be considered admissible.  
 
4.5 Burden of proof 
Burden of proof is the question of who has to prove exhaustion or failure. This points to the 
party that must provide evidence for their allegation.172 The IACmHR and IACtHR  
regards the burden of proof with exhaustion of domestic remedies, as shifting,173 as it shifts 
between the petitioner and the state, each providing proof of their claims.174 
 
The burden of proof starts with the petitioner when submitting the claim to the Commission. 
According to the IACmHR’s Rules of Procedure art 28(8) petitions shall contain “any steps 
taken to exhaust domestic remedies, or the impossibility of doing so”. This means that a  
petitioner should provide detailed information about which domestic remedies have been tried 
or why it was not possible to make use of them.175 
 
There is an extra rule for the Commission when it comes to exhaustion of domestic remedies 
and the burden of proof. The Regulations of the IACmHR art 37(3) states that when a  
petitioner is unable to prove exhaustion of domestic remedies, the burden of proof shifts  
directly to the state, which has to prove non-exhaustion, unless it is clear from the information 
in the petition. For the Commission, remedies will therefore often be presumed exhausted 
without any proof thereof. This is because the Commission has a principle of accepting as true 
what the petitioner alleges and the state does not contest, provided there is no evidence to the 
contrary.176  
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After the arguments of the petitioner, the burden of proof shifts to the state, which has to  
specifically claim non-exhaustion of domestic remedies before the Commission, specify 
which remedies remains and provide information about their effectiveness, adequacy and 
availability.177 Merely showing their existence is not enough.178 It is important to note that 
neither the Court nor the Commission has a responsibility to identify ex officio remedies that 
remains to be exhausted; it is incumbent upon the state.179 
 
If the state proves existing available and effective remedies that should have been utilized by 
the petitioner, the burden of proof shifts back to the petitioner.180 He or she then has the  
burden of that proving the specified remedies were exhausted, or that the remedy falls within 
one of the exceptions in art 46(2).181 If the petitioner invokes one of the exceptions in art 
46(2), it is up to the petitioner to demonstrate that such exceptions apply, and for the state to 
disclaim the reasons given by the petitioner and prove available remedies.182  
 
The petitioner must generally give some information on exhaustion or reason for  
non-exhaustion.183 If evidence is hard to find in the specific case, showing a pattern or  
practice of systematic human rights violations of similar type can help persuade the  
Commission or Court.184 They “interpret the law according to the pro homine principle, which 
requires the interpretation most favourable to the protection of human rights”.185 Even so, the 
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Court has stated that “It must not be rashly presumed that a State Party to the Convention has 
failed to comply with its obligations to provide effective domestic remedies.”186 This means, 
that even though the Commission and Court give the favour of the doubt to the petitioner, one 
should not take ones burden of proof lightly.  
 
4.6 Exceptions to the rule of prior exhaustion of domestic 
remedies 
There are three exceptions to the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies, spelled out in 
art 46(2). They are; where there is no due process of law or no remedy to exhaust (art 
46(2)(a)), where there is no access to the remedies (art 46(2)(b)) and where there has been an 
unwarranted delay in the proceedings of the remedies (art 46(2)(c)). Art 46(2) provides  
exceptions from the principle, where remedies exist in the domestic system, but pursuit of 
such remedies would be a futile exercise in vindicating the rights of the Convention,187 to 
make sure the principle of domestic remedies never leave a victim defenceless.188 According 
to Sing, the most commonly advanced by petitioners is the third, unwarranted delay, while the 
other two are rarely invoked.189 Often however, a petitioner will advance more than one ex-
ception, or even all three. 
 
When an exception is accepted by the Commission or Court, the petitioner is under no  
obligation to pursue such remedies. In fact, the state is not only barred from the preliminary 
objection of non-exhaustion, it is charged with a new violation under the Convention.190 If 
however, there are other available, effective and adequate remedies in the domestic system, 
the petitioner will not be exempt from trying those, only the ones to which the exception  
applies. In practice though, if an exception exists for one remedy, it often affects the rest, and 
an exception to the principle is accepted.  
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4.6.1 No remedy 
Art 46(2)(a) states that the principle of domestic remedies shall not be applicable when the 
domestic legislation of the state does not afford due process of law for the right that has  
allegedly been violated. This means that when there is no remedy that corresponds to the  
alleged wrong, or that the remedy does not function as it should, it needs not be exhausted.  
 
The exception corresponds to the obligations the state has under the Convention to provide 
effective judicial remedies to victims of human rights violations (art 25), and that remedies 
must be in accordance with the rules of due process of law (art 8(1)), to guarantee the free and 
full exercise of the rights in the Convention.191 This has often been expressed with the words 
that a remedy must be adequate and effective.  
 
4.6.1.1 Adequate 
“Adequate domestic remedies are those which are suitable to address an infringement of a 
legal right.”192 If a remedy is not adequate in the specific case, it needs not be exhausted.193 
To address an infringement, the remedy must be capable of redressing the alleged harm in the 
case.194 This means that the remedy must have the possibility of actually giving the relief 
sought by the applicant, which is a consideration of the type of relief the remedy can give in a 
successful outcome. What relief sought in the case, depends on the nature of the alleged  
violation. An adequate remedy should further assist in ascertaining the facts of the case, and 
establish individual responsibility for the violation.195 
 
An example of an inadequate remedy is a presumptive finding of death for a person who is 
disappeared, for the purpose of allowing heirs to dispose of the belongings, when the remedy 
sought is to find such person or obtain his or her liberty.196 The remedy does not do what the 
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violation of enforced disappearances calls for, nor what the petitioners wish as a result, hence, 
it is not an adequate remedy for the situation and needs not be exhausted. If there are no other 
remedies that fit the relief sought, no due process of law exists, and no remedy needs to be 
exhausted.  
 
4.6.1.2 Effective 
“A remedy must also be effective, that is, capable of producing the result for which it was 
designed.”197 Many reasons can make a remedy ineffective, for example if it is powerless to 
compel the authorities, it presents a danger to those who invoke it or if it is not impartially 
applied.198 Further it can be denied for trivial reasons, without examination of merits or there 
can be a practice to prevent certain people from invoking remedies that would normally be 
available to others, and it is proven tolerated by the state.199 However, the mere fact that a 
remedy in a specific case does not produce a favourable result does not mean it is ineffective, 
other factor can intervene, like timeliness of use.200 
 
“Domestic remedies that prove illusory due to the circumstances of the case or the general 
situation in the State cannot be considered effective”.201 An example of this is the  
Constitutional Court v. Peru case, where the Court stated that at unjustified delay of six 
months for the domestic courts to reject the application for the remedy of amparo, made the 
remedy illusory and ineffective.202  
 
A remedy is effective if it both exists and offers a reasonable prospect of success. It must be 
capable in practice to provide redress for the alleged wrong, not just in theory, and it must be 
able to do so in the particular case.203 If there are serious reasons to believe the petitioner in 
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the case have no real prospect of success, then the remedy is not effective in that particular 
case.204 Similarly, the remedy must not seem futile or unhelpful.205 However, there must be 
some evidence to its ineffectiveness, a mere doubt or a subjective belief that a remedy is  
ineffective is not sufficient.206 The test of effectiveness of a remedy, is to avoid exhaustion 
becoming a senseless formality, where it has no likelihood of success. 
 
4.6.2 No access 
The second exception from the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies, is where there is 
no access to the remedy, often called a lack of availability (art 46(2)(b)). This has two parts; 
the first is that the remedy exists at the time when the petition is filed with the Commission 
and is capable of being applied, the second that the victim or next of kin is the appropriate one 
to use the remedy.207 A remedy is available if it can be pursued by the petitioner without  
difficulties or impediments.208 If circumstances of the case, or in general in the state, makes 
access to the remedy very difficult, it cannot be considered available, and need not be  
exhausted.209 Reasons that can make a remedy not available can be age, mental capacity,  
language difficulties or that the petitioner has been deported from the state.210  
 
The IACtHR in an advisory opinion has discussed two examples where domestic remedies are 
not available.211 The first question of the advisory opinion was whether a petitioner is required 
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to exhaust domestic remedies where he cannot afford legal assistance or obligatory filing fees. 
The Court saw that a strict use of the exhaustion principle is such circumstances might breach 
the principle in the Conventions art 1(1) for discrimination based on “social condition”.212 
This because a strict application of the principle in this case effectively would exclude an  
entire group of people from using the regional system due to their economic status, and it is 
the duty of states to organize the governmental apparatus in such a way so they ensure the 
enjoyment of human rights for everyone.213  
 
Free legal aid can sometimes repair the petitioner’s lack of resources, but is not always given 
or available in the state. So, where “legal services are required either as a matter of law of fact 
in order for a right guaranteed by the Convention to be recognized and a person is unable to 
obtain such services because of his indigency, then that person would be exempt from the 
requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. The same would be true of cases requiring the 
payment of a filing fee.”214 It is important however to show that legal services are needed, and 
not just preferred.215 Also important is it that the petitioner has tried to bring to the attention 
of the state his or hers inability to utilize remedies due to economic difficulties, for example 
by seeking free legal aid.216 
 
The second question of the advisory opinion regarded a general fear in the legal community. 
The Court stated that “where an individual requires legal representation and a generalized fear 
in the legal community prevents him from obtaining such representation, the exceptions set 
out in Article 46(2)(b) is fully applicable and the individual is exempt from the requirement to 
exhaust domestic remedies.”217 
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In short, a domestic remedy is available if it exists in the law, is capable of being applied in 
practice by authorities and is applicable by the petitioner in the specific case.218 If it is  
impossible to access due to for example indigence, it is not available.  
 
4.6.3 Unwarranted delay 
The third exception to the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies is where there has 
been an unwarranted delay in rendering a final judgement.219 In Mangas v. Nicaragua the 
Commission summarized the jurisprudence on delay by first stating that in the Inter-American 
system, justice for human rights violations should be given within reasonable time.220 If a case 
is not solved before the domestic courts within a reasonable time, the petitioner is released 
from the obligation to exhaust the remedies.221 That is, if the delay is not justified.  
 
Both the Inter-American System and the European System of Human Rights have developed 
a series of criteria for considering whether the delay in justice is justified.222 It depends on the 
complexity of the case, the conduct of the damaged party in terms of cooperation, how the 
investigative stage of the cases evolves and the actions of the judicial authorities.223 The  
deliberations must be made on an objective basis, but with considerations to the special  
circumstances of each case.224  
 
To consider the complexity of the case it is important to look at the factual setting of the case, 
and the type of right that has been allegedly violated.225 In Mangas v. Nicaragua for example, 
the case involved a single criminal act and a single victim, and it was considered  
                                                 
218 Sullivan, p. 14.  
219 Art 46(2)(c) of the Convention. 
220 IACmHR, Mangas v. Nicaragua, para 118; IACtHR, “White Van” (Paniagua-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, 
merits, 1998, para 155;  IACtHR, Gomes Lund et al. ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil, para 42; IACtHR, 
Suárez-Rosero v. Ecuador, merits, 1997, para 73. 
221 IACmHR, Mangas v. Nicaragua, para 120.  
222 Ibid. para 121 
223 Ibid. para 122 
224 Ibid. Para 123.  
225 IACtHR, Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua, merits, 1997, para 80-81. 
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non-complex. If on the other hand, the case is complex and complicated, involving several 
parties and events, a longer delay can be justified.226 It is important to note however, that the 
complexity of the case can only justify the delay, if it actually contributed to the delay.227  
 
If the delay can be attributed to acts of the petitioner, then the delay is justified, and the  
exception is not applicable.228 An example of this is José Xavier Gando Chica v. Ecuador 
where the delay in the criminal case was due to the petitioner having fled the country and was 
living as a fugitive from justice.229  
 
Exactly how much time must have passed for a delay to be unwarranted depends on the case 
and its considerations. Generally, however, the Court has held that when about five years has 
passed since the initiation of the proceedings and the case is brought to the Commission  
without a final judgement, there has been an unwarranted delay, and the petitioner is excused 
from exhausting domestic remedies.230  
 
5 Case-study of the practice of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights 
After having established the basic features of the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies 
in the Inter-American system of human rights, the thesis will now review the case-law for the 
last 5 years. This part builds on the annual rapports of the Commission and Court, and all the 
available cases deemed inadmissible at the IACmHR in the last 5 years.231 The goal is to look 
for trends, and whether there seems to be undue hardships with the principle of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies.  
 
                                                 
226 IACmHR, Mario Eduardo Firmenich v Argentina, Report No. 17/89, petition 10.037, 1989.  
227 IACmHR, Mangas v. Nicaragua, para 127, citing ECmHR.  
228 IACmHR, César Verduga Vélez v. Ecuador, Report No. 18/02, Petition 12.274, 2002, para. 29 
229 IACmHR, Report No. 22/12, petition 398-02, 2012, para 33 
230 Pasqualucci, p. 97; IACtHR, Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Merits, para 81; IACtHR, Las Palmeras v. Colom-
bia, preliminary objections, para 38.  
231 In total 62 cases were deemed inadmissible by the Commission in this period, but only 59 of the cases were 
available on the Commissions webpages.  
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This part builds on the case-law of the Commission and not the Court because the  
Commission considers the cases first. Even though the Court can reject the Commissions  
consideration of admissibility, it is clear that it rarely does so after having reviewed all the 
annual rapports from the Court for the last 10 years, where no cases have been rejected due to 
failure of exhaustion of domestic remedies.  
 
5.1 Petitions received and evaluated by the Commission 
5.1.1 New petitions and initial evaluation 
The figure below shows how many petitions the Commission has received in the last 10 years, 
in total 15.437 petitions; which is well over a thousand each year. The number of petitions is 
increasing, with 2013 giving the highest number to date.  
 
Figure 1: Petitions received and considered for processing 
Year Petitions 
received 
Petitions 
evaluated 
per year 
Petitions not 
accepted for  
processing 
% not 
accepted 
Petitions 
accepted for 
processing 
% accepted 
2013 2061 736 613 83 % 123 17 % 
2012 1936 1011 874 83 % 137 17 % 
2011 1658 1051 789 75 % 262 25 % 
2010 1598 1676 1401 84 % 275 16 % 
2009 1431 2064 1942 94 % 122 6 % 
2008 1323 1668 1550 93 % 118 7 % 
2007 1456 1331 1205 91 % 126 9 % 
2006 1325 1315 1168 89 % 147 11 % 
2005 1330 1187 1037 87 % 150 13 % 
2004 1319 1024 864 84 % 160 16 % 
Total 15437 13063 11443 88 % 1620 12 % 
 
The figure further shows how many petitions are evaluated by the Commission each year. The 
number of petitions evaluated differs greatly from year to year, with 2009 as a top year and 
2013 as the low. Only three years have the Commission managed to evaluate more petitions 
than received, most years evaluating far less. This creates a backlog of cases, and the trend 
seem to be worsening in the last few years, with less and less cases being evaluated each year.  
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Initial evaluation comes before the consideration on admissibility, and is the first filter for 
petitions.232 This is however where most of the petitions are rejected, with an average of 88% 
of the petitions denied for processing.233 From the view point of the petitioners, 2011 was 
their best year, as 25% of the petitions that year was accepted for processing, while in 2009, 
only a marginal 6% made it through the initial evaluation.  
 
5.1.2 Petitions considered on admissibility  
As shown in the figure below, of the 13.063 petitions evaluated in the last 10 years, only 667 
were considered on admissibility. This means that even out of the 1620 that made it through 
the first evaluation,234 only 41% made it to the admissibility considerations, and of all the  
petitions evaluated, only 5% make it to the preliminary stages where exhaustion of domestic 
remedies are considered. This means that a staggering 95% of the petitions the Commission 
evaluates are rejected even before considering their admissibility, such as jurisdiction and 
exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
 
Figure 2: Petitions evaluated vs considered for admissibility 
Year  Petitions evaluated 
per year 
Petitions considered 
for admissibility 
% petition considered 
for admissibility 
2013 736 53 7 % 
2012 1011 59 6 % 
2011 1051 78 7 % 
2010 1676 83 5 % 
2009 2064 77 4 % 
2008 1668 59 4 % 
2007 1331 65 5 % 
2006 1315 70 5 % 
2005 1187 69 6 % 
2004 1024 54 5 % 
Total  13063 667 5 %  
 
                                                 
232 Shelton, p. 14.  
233 See also Human Rights Clinic, Maximizing Justice, Minimizing Delay: Streamlining Procedures od the Inter-
American Commisson on Human Rights, The University of Texas School of Law, December 2011, who 
found similar numbers.  
234 Se figure 1 above. 
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So with 95% of the petitions already eliminated, how many are then rejected at the  
admissibility stage?  
 
Figure 3: Petitions admissibility 
Year Total petitions Petitions 
admissible 
% admissible Petitions 
inadmissible 
% inadmissible 
2013 53 44 83 % 9 17 % 
2012 59 42 71 % 17 29 % 
2011 78 67 85 % 11 15 % 
2010 83 73 88 % 10 12 % 
2009 77 62 81 % 15 19 % 
2008 59 49 83 % 10 17 % 
2007 65 51 78 % 14 22 % 
2006 70 56 80 % 14 20 % 
2005 69 53 77 % 16 23 % 
2004 54 45 83 % 9 17 % 
Total  667 542 81 % 125 19 % 
 
According to the numbers of the last 10 years, most of the petitions that make it through the 
initial evaluation before the Commission make it through the admissibility consideration.  
Only about 19% are rejected at this stage, while an average of 81% are considered admissible. 
But, as admissibility is not only about exhaustion of domestic remedies, cases can be rejected 
at this stage for other reasons such as timeliness of the petition, the question is; how many are 
rejected for non-exhaustion? 
 
5.2 Case-study of cases deemed inadmissible in the last 5 years 
5.2.1 Number of cases rejected for non-exhaustion 
In total 125 cases were rejected on admissibility in the last 10 years, 62 in the last 5 years. To 
see how many cases were rejected on the basis of non-exhaustion, as opposed to other  
reasons, each of the available cases in the last 5 years have been examined.235 The figure  
below shows how many of the cases the Commission deemed inadmissible were for failure of 
exhaustion of domestic remedies and how many were for other reasons.236 
                                                 
235 Out of the 62 cases, only 59 were available on the Commissions pages. For the full list of considered cases, se 
annex 1.  
236 Other reasons include art 46(1)(b), 47(b) and 47(d). 
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Figure 4: Cases deemed inadmissible 
Year  Total cases 
per year 
Inadmissible 
due to non-
exhaustion* 
% inadmissible 
exhaustion 
Inadmissible 
due to other 
reasons 
% inadmissible 
other reasons 
2013 7 6 86 % 1 14 % 
2012 17 6 35 % 11 65 % 
2011 10 4 40 % 6 60 % 
2010 10 5 50 % 5 50 % 
2009 15 8 53 % 7 47 % 
Total 59 29 49 % 30 51 % 
* When more than one reason was given, it was counted as inadmissible due to exhaustion and not 
in the column "other reasons". 
 
Of the 59 cases reviewed, only 29 (49%) for non-exhaustion, while 30 were rejected based on 
other reasons. The numbers vary greatly from year to year, with non-exhaustion being the 
reason for rejection in a staggering 86% of the cases in 2013, while only 35% the year  
before.237 
 
On average, about 21% of the cases at the admissibility stages have been rejected in the last 5 
years. With about half of these for other reasons, only around 10% are in fact rejected by the 
Commission for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. Of the cases rejected for other reasons, 
25 had fulfilled the requirement of exhaustion, in 4 cases exhaustion was not considered, and 
in the last the Commission was inconclusive. This shows that in the majority of the cases, 
even when the case is ultimately rejected due to other reasons, exhaustion of domestic  
remedies is fulfilled.  
 
Exhaustion of domestic remedies can seem like a daunting task for a petitioner, but according 
to the case-law of the last 5 years, the Commission have declared it fulfilled in about 90% of 
the cases. The question then is, are there any trends in why the remaining 10% have not  
fulfilled this requirement? 
 
                                                 
237 For a breakdown according to country, see annex 2.  
  46   
 
5.2.2 Reasons for non-fulfilment 
Why are some cases rejected for non-exhaustion? Are there some reasons that come up more 
than others? The figure below shows in a simplified manner the reasons for non-exhaustion in 
the relevant 29 cases from the last 5 years.  
 
Figure 5: Reasons for non-exhaustion, Commission 2009-2013 
Reasons # % 
Still remaining remedies (shown by state or Commission) 10 35 % 
Procedural requirements in domestic system 6 21 % 
Tried for an exception but insufficient information* 5 17 % 
No/not sufficient information from petitioner on exhaustion 3 10 % 
Did not appeal, or follow through on appeal 3 10 % 
Mistaken procedural route in domestic system 2 7 % 
Total 19 100 % 
* 1 for belief of ineffectiveness and costs, 2 for economic situation 
 
The most common reason for non-exhaustion, is that the state completes its burden of proof, 
and shows available, effective and adequate remedies still to be exhausted. This is not so  
surprising, as states would have an interest in fulfilling its part. Nor is it surprising that 10% is 
because of insufficient information from the petitioner and that 17% tried for an exception but 
failed due to lack of information. Many petitioners might not know how to show exhaustion 
of domestic remedies, and therefore provide none or little information on the subject. They 
might also be unaware of how important this is for their case.   
 
Of the five that tried for an exception but failed, one petitioner did not exhaust domestic  
remedies due to a belief of ineffectiveness and high costs, but did not offer any proof of her 
beliefs or economic situation. Further two claimed insufficient funds to use domestic  
remedies, but neither proved their economic situation, nor that they had tried to obtain free 
legal aid or similar. One petitioner tried for unwarranted delay in justice, but was denied as 
the Commission saw the delay as justified from the state, due to the fact that the criminal trial 
was paused because the petitioner had fled the country.  
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What is surprising is that 21% of the cases are rejected because the petitioner did not  
complete domestic remedies due to procedural errors in the domestic system. This can be a 
failure to use remedies in a timely fashion, but has the serious consequence of excluding the 
petitioner form exhausting that remedy, now and in the future. Effectively, a failure of  
procedural requirements in the domestic system can bar a case from ever reaching the  
regional level, because one can never fulfil domestic remedies. Where the state shows  
remedies still to be exhausted, the petitioner can sometimes go back and use such remedies, 
and file a petition again at a later point in time. But, when one is barred from using such  
domestic remedies due to procedural requirements, a regional petition is barred altogether.   
 
As the figure shows, a large number of petitioners fail the exhaustion requirement on lack of 
information, and a large number due to problems navigating their own domestic system. It can 
be questioned whether the Commission gives the sufficient information on the importance 
when they send petitioners request for more information. It can also be questioned whether a 
consideration of the complexity of navigation of the domestic system should be considered as 
an exception, considering the large number of petitioners who fail to navigate it correctly.  
 
5.2.3 The type of cases rejected due to non-exhaustion 
So what type of cases are linked with failure to exhaust domestic remedies? The figure below 
shows the general type of claim alleged violated in the 29 inadmissible cases. It is important 
to note, that each case has only been put in one category dependent on the main claim of the 
case.  
 
Figure 6: Type of claim, Commission 2009-2013 
Type of claim Inadmissible due to  
exhaustion 
%  
Job, unlawful termination of job 9 31 % 
Payment, salary, debt and social benefits 7 24 % 
Detention and criminal law 4 14 % 
Non-compliance with a judgment 3 10 % 
Discrimination 2 7 % 
Procedural guarantees 2 7 % 
Loss of investment or savings 2 7 % 
Total 6 100 % 
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The clear majority of the cases are work related, and a high number have to do with alleged 
unlawful terminations. Another large group has to do with salary and other money related 
issues, including problems with social benefits and debts from the state to the petitioner.  
Although these can be serious cases, one can fortunately say that they are in a different  
category than for example enforced disappearances, for which there are no cases denied in the 
last 5 years.  
 
Only four cases have to do with direct threats to life and freedom, as they deal with detention 
and criminal law, one of these being the case of the fugitive from law claiming delay in his 
criminal proceedings mentioned above. Other potentially serious cases are discrimination and 
failure of procedural guarantees, for which there are two cases each.  
 
In general however one can say that fortunately most of the cases deal with alleged violations 
of a less serious type, although clearly serious to the petitioners, and only a very few have to 
do with the more grave breaches, such as torture and ill-treatment. This could suggest that the 
Commission is more lenient on graver breaches of the Convention, although without a greater 
case study this cannot be said for sure. It could simply be that petitioners with graver  
allegations generally are better at bringing their cases forward.   
 
5.3 Summary 
In the period between 2004 and 2013, the Commission received 15.437 petitions and  
evaluated 13.063 for processing. Of these 13.063, only 667 (5%) were considered for  
admissibility, meaning that 95% of petitions were rejected before the admissibility  
considerations. At the admissibility stage, an average of 10% were rejected for non-
exhaustion, while another 11% for other reasons.238 This means that of all the petitions evalu-
ated, only about 0,5% were rejected due to non-exhaustion.239  
 
In the last 5 years only 29 cases have been rejected on this ground, compared to the 288240 
cases that have been accepted. Reasons for non-exhaustion varies, with states showing  
                                                 
238 In the period 2009-2013 
239 In comparison 4,1% of evaluated petitions were accepted after admissibility considerations.  
240 Cases accepted at admissibility stage between 2009 and 2013, se figure 3. 
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remaining remedies and procedural difficulties in the home state at the top of the list. Further, 
the cases rejected are fortunately rarely allegations of the graves human rights violations, but 
rather work related issues, which seems surprising coming from a region historically plagued 
with grave human rights violations, such as enforced disappearances and torture.  
 
6 Conclusion 
This thesis reviews the principle of exhaustion of domestic remedies in the regional protection 
of human rights in the Americas. It summarizes the components of the principle, through  
literature and case law, with the purpose to see how the rule functions in practice, and if it 
completes the intent of the Convention of effective protection of human rights,241 or if it acts 
as an unjust barrier for petitioners in need.  
 
There are many components to the principle, which makes it complex and complicated to  
understand. One must know to fulfil domestic remedies, to use it correctly in the domestic 
system, within time limits and other procedural requirements and one must try the correct 
remedies for the violation. Further, one must have a final decision and have proclaimed in 
substance the same claim before both the domestic and regional system. Finally, one must 
have exhausted the remedies at the right time, before the petition is considered by the Com-
mission, but not too long before either.242  
 
If one wishes to try for an exception to the rule, one must show ineffectiveness or  
unavailability of remedies, or in the case of delay, prove that it is attributable to the state, and 
unjust. It is important to have proof and explanations for all one has done, and not done, while 
the state tries to prove the contrary. Often detailed information is required from the petitioner, 
to either fulfil the rule or be eligible for an exception. It is no wonder this principle seems to 
have a potential for procedural massacre of petitions.243 At least, so it may seem from the  
onset. However, case law shows a different picture.  
 
                                                 
241 IACtHR, Velasquez Rodriguez, preliminary objections, para 30.  
242 Art 46(1)(b) 
243 Trindade, The Application, p. 52.  
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The Inter-American system seems to have acknowledged the difficulties petitioners face, and 
have adjusted their practice accordingly. The Commission and Court have shown a flexible 
application of the principle, and instead of holding firm to general principles, have adopted a 
case-by-case consideration, considering the circumstances of the particular case and petition-
er. In addition, they seem to show a lenient use of the exceptions, with for example the  
advisory opinion on the subject widening its use considerably with the inclusion of indigence 
and fear in the legal community as accepted excuses. This flexibility might be why so few 
cases fail the test of exhaustion, and exceptions to the rule seems to be in frequent use.  
 
The case-study of the inadmissible petitions in the last 5 years, show that only around 10% of 
petitions failed the test of exhaustion, which considering the potential difficulties faced by 
petitioners, seems like a low number. However, when considering that these are the ones who 
have been fortunate enough to make it all the way to the admissibility considerations, the 
number seems more significant. Many fail due to lack of sufficient information from the  
petitioner, which again stresses the importance of information about this principle to those 
trying to access the system. Another big group fail due to the state proving effective and 
available remedies yet to be exhausted, which is not surprising due to the states privileged 
position on information about its system for justice, and information is not always equally 
accessible to the petitioners. From the numbers it seems evident that information on the  
importance of exhaustion of domestic remedies, how to exhaust and ones burden of proof 
might go some way to avoid petitioners failing the requirement. Information to petitioners 
should stress that information, such as attempts to access or reasons for non-exhaustion, can 
be important for one’s admissibility, although such information might not seem important to 
the petitioner. 
 
More worrying might be the number of petitioners who fail the exhaustion principle due to 
problems with procedural requirements in their domestic systems. The Commission and Court 
have required that the procedural requirements must be reasonable to be accepted, but one 
might question whether this consideration works, since it is given little space in the cases 
deemed inadmissible in the last five years. It might be that the Commission is wanting  
information on why the requirements are not reasonable, information the petitioners might not 
know they need to give.  
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Fortunately, the majority of the cases rejected are not of the gravest kind, and one might  
question whether the Commission and Court are more lenient with petitioners alleging such 
violations, like enforced disappearances or right to life. More likely is it however that they 
fulfil due to the fact that most of these cases fall under criminal law, an area generally covered 
by the states obligation to investigate and prosecute, and where a civil lawsuit would not be 
adequate nor necessary to fulfil domestic remedies. Cases more frequently rejected, like the 
right to job stability, are civil cases, where the burden to exhaust domestic remedies fall on 
the petitioner.  
 
Overall, the Commission and Court seem to apply the principle in such a manner as to not let 
it become an unjust barrier for petitioners, but rather a part of the system, a hurdle to  
overcome but a possible one. The ones that are rejected due to non-exhaustion, are so by the 
Commission, as the Court has not rejected a single case due to failure of exhaustion in the last 
10 years. Flexibility and a willingness to expand upon the exceptions by both the Commission 
and Court seems to contribute greatly, and is probably the reason why not more petitions fail 
exhaustion of domestic remedies.  
 
Even though some petitioners do fail this requirement, it seems like a small drop in the  
case-load ocean, compared to all the cases rejected before admissibility considerations. This 
might be where one should focus the attention; why so many petitions fail at the early stages 
of processing. Why are 95% of cases processed rejected early on? Moreover, what can be 
done to help these petitioners get their case heard? 
  52   
 
Table of reference 
Literature:  
Buergenthal, T., Shelton, D., Stewart, D.P, "International Human Rights in a nutshell", 4th 
edition, West Publishing, 2009.  
Donoso, Gina, “Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ reparation judgments; Strengths and 
challenges for a comprehensive approach”, Revista IIDH, vol 49, 2009. Avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r24577.pdf  
Dugard, J.R, Special Rapporteur, Doc A7CN.4/514, Second report on Diplomatic Protection, 
February 28, 2001. 
European Court of Human Rights, Key case-law issues; Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies, 
April 28, 2006. 
González, Felipe, “The Experience of the Inter-American Human Rights System”, 40 
VUWLR, p. 103-126, 2009. Available at: 
http://www.victoria.ac.nz/law/nzacl/PDFS/Vol_14_2008/Gonzalez.pdf  
Higgins, Rosalyn, “Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It”, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1994  
Hoyos, Gloria Orrego, “The Amparo Context in Latin American Jurisdiction: an approach to 
an empowering action”, April 2013, available at: 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Amparo.htm 
Human Rights Clinic, Maximizing Justice, Minimizing Delay: Streamlining Procedures od the 
Inter-American Commisson on Human Rights, The University of Texas School of Law, 
December 2011. Available at: 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/Maximizing_Justice_Minimizing_
Delay_at_the_IACHR.pdf  
The International Justice Project, “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: How 
Can it be Utilized in a Capital Case”, available at: 
http://www.internationaljusticeproject.org/pdfs/oas.pdf (accessed 15.11/14) 
Mayeux, Bridget and Mirabal, Justin, “Collective and Moral Reparations in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights”, under the supervision of Prof. Ariel Dulitzky, Hu-
man Rights Clinic, University of Texas School of Law, November 2009. Available at: 
http://www.utexas.edu/law/clinics/humanrights/work/HRC_F09_CollectiveReparations.
pdf  
Parlett, Kate, “The Individual and Structural Change in the International Legal System”, 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (1)3: 60–80, 2012. Avaliable 
at: http://joomla.cjicl.org.uk/journal/article/60  
  53   
 
Paulsson, Jan, "Denial of Justice in International Law”, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Pasqualucci, Jo M, "The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, second edition, Cambridge University Press, 2014. 
Reinsberg, L.J, "Advocacy before the Inter-American System: A Manual for Attorneys and 
Advocates", second edition, 2014. 
Scherr, Kathrin Maria, D’ Ascoli, Silvia, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Local Remedies in 
the International Law Doctrine and Its Application in the Specific Context of Human 
Rights Protection,” EUI Working Papers, LAW 2007/02, European University Institute,  
2007. 
Shelton, Dinah, “The Rules and the Reality of petition Procedures in the Inter-American Hu-
man Rights System”, “The Future of the Inter-American Human Rights System”, Work-
ing Paper #2, The Centre for Civil and Human Rights, University of Notre Dame, May 
2014 
Singh, Ajit, “American Convention on Human Rights Articles 46 ( 1 )( a ) and 46 ( 2 )( c ): 
Achilles Heel or Trojan Horse ?,” Inter-American and European Human Rights Journal, 
Vol. 5, No. 1-2, 2013, avaliable at: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1753329 
Smith, Rhona K.M, “Textbook on International Human Rights”, Oxford University press, 
fifth edition, 2012.  
Sullivan, Donna J, “Overview of the Rule Requiring the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies 
under the Optional Protocol to CEDAW,” OP-CEDAW Technical Papers No. 1, 2008. 
Trindade, A A C, “Origin and Historical Development of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local 
Remedies in International Law,” RBDI, No. 2, pp. 499–527, 1976. 
Trindade, A.A.C, "The Aplication of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in 
International Law - Its rationale in the international protection of individual rights", 
Cambridge University Press, 1983.  
Trindade, A.A.C., “The Access of Individuals to International Justice”, Oxford University 
Press, 2012.  
Vermeer-Künzli, Anna Maria Helena, “The Protection of Individuals by means of Diplomatic 
Protection: Diplomatic Protection as a Human Rights Instrument”, PrintPartners 
Ipskamp, 2007. Available at: 
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/bitstream/handle/1887/12538/proefschrift%20overmeer
%20binnenwerk.pdf?sequence=2 
 
 
 
  54   
 
Treaties/Conventions:  
OAS, American Convention on Human Rights, Pact of San Jose Costa Rica, 1969. 
OAS, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948. 
OAS, Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Resolution No. 448, October 
1979.  
OAS, Statute of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Resolution No. 447, 
October 1979.  
OAS, Charter of the Organization of American States, 1967.  
IACmHR, Regulations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 1992.  
IACtHR, Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, approved 
November 2000, partially amended January 2009.  
Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, 1950. 
United Nations General Assembly, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984. 
United Nations General Assembly, First Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, 1966. 
United Nations General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination ,1965. 
Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Banjul 
Charter, 1981. 
Central American Court of Justice, Convention for the Establishment of a Central American 
Court of Justice, December 20, 1907. 
United Nations General Assembly, Vienna Convention on the law of treaties, 1969. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  55   
 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights: 
IACtHR, 19 Merchants v. Colombia, merits, reparations and costs, July 5, 2004 
IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-11 / 90 Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies ( 
Art . 46 ( 1 ), 46 ( 2 )( a ) and 46 ( 2 )( b ) American Convention on Human Rights), 
August 10, 1990. 
IACtHR, Acevedo-Jaramillo et al. v. Peru, preliminary objections, merits, reparations and 
costs, February 7, 2006.  
IACtHR, Baena-Ricardo et al. (270 workers) v. Panama, Competence, November 28, 2003.  
IACtHR, Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, preliminary objections, September 3, 1998. 
IACtHR, Castillo-Petruzzi et al. v. Peru, preliminary objections, September 4, 1998.  
IACtHR, Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, August 6, 2008.  
IACtHR, Chocrón Chocron v . Venezuela, preliminary objectons, merits, reparations and 
costs, July 1, 2011. 
IACtHR, Constitutional Court v. Peru, merits, reparations and costs, January 31, 2001.  
IACtHR, The Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et al.) v. Peru, prelimi-
nary objections, merits, reparations and costs, November 24, 2006. 
IACtHR, Durand and Ugarte v . Peru, preliminary objections, May 28, 1999. 
IACtHR, Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v . Honduras, merits, March 15, 1989. 
IACtHR, Fairén-Garbi and Solís-Corrales v . Honduras, preliminary objections, March 15, 
1987. 
IACtHR, “Five Pensioners” v. Peru, Merits, reparations and costs, February 28, 2003 
IACtHR, Genie-Lacayo v. Nicaragua, merits, reparations and costs, Januray 29, 1997. 
IACtHR, Godínez-Cruz v . Honduras, preliminary objections, June 26, 1987. 
IACtHR, Gomes Lund et al. (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil, preliminary objections, 
merits, reparations and costs, November 24, 2010. 
IACtHR, Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, 
July 2, 2004.  
IACtHR, Las Palmeras v . Colombia, merits, December 6, 2001. 
  56   
 
IACtHR, Reverón Trujillo v . Venezuela, preliminary objections, merits, reparations and 
costs, June 30, 2009. 
IACtHR, Suárez-Rosero v. Ecuador, merits, November 12, 1997. 
IACtHR, The Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, preliminary 
objections, February 1, 2000.  
IACtHR, Usón Ramírez v. Venezuela, preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, 
November 20, 2009. 
IACtHR, Velásquez-Rodríguez v . Honduras, merits, July 29, 1988.  
IACtHR, Velásquez-Rodríguez v . Honduras, preliminary objections, June 26, 1987. 
IACtHR, Vélez Loor v. Panama, preliminary objections, merits, reparations and costs, 
November 23, 2010.  
IACtHR, Viviana Gallardo et al. v. Costa Rica, November 13, 1981. 
IACtHR, “White Van” (Paniagua-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, merits, March 8, 1998. 
IACtHR, Annual report 2013, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2013.pdf 
IACtHR, Annual report 2012, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2012.pdf 
IACtHR, Annual report 2011, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2011.pdf 
IACtHR, Annual report 2010, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2010.pdf 
IACtHR, Annual report 2009, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2009.pdf 
IACtHR, Annual report 2008, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2008.pdf 
IACtHR, Annual report 2007, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2007.pdf 
IACtHR, Annual report 2006, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2006.pdf 
IACtHR, Annual report 2005, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2005.pdf 
  57   
 
IACtHR, Annual report 2004, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2004.pdf  
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights:  
IACmHR, Abu-Ali Abdur Rahman v. USA, Report 39/03, petition 136/02, 2003.  
IACmHR, Alfredo Aresse et al. v. Argentina, Report No. 107,13, petition 89-00, 2013. 
IACmHR, Arges Sequeira Mangas vs Nicaragua, Report No. 52/97, petition 11.218, 1998. 
IACmHR, Alicia Alvarez Trinidad v. Peru, Report No. 5/10, petition 12.118, 2010. 
IACmHR, Cañas Cano et al. v. Colombia, Report No. 75/03, petition 42/02, 2003. 
IACmHR, César Verduga Vélez v. Ecuador, Report No. 18/02, Petition 12.274, 2002. 
IACmHR, Colmenares Castillo v. Mexico, Report No. 36/05, petition 12.170, 2005. 
IACmHR, Ciro Abdías Bodero Arellano v. Peru, Report No. 44/09, petition 12.161, 2009. 
IACmHR, Domínguez Domenichetti v. Argentina, Report No. 51/03, petition 11.819, 2003.  
IACmHR, Escher v. Brazil, Report no. 18/06, petition 12.353, 2006.  
IACmHR, Fransisco José Magi v. Argentina, Report No. 106/13, petition 951-01, 2013. 
IACmHR, Gray Graham v. United States, Report No. 51/00, petition 11.193, 2000. 
IACmHR, Isamu Carlos Shibayama et al v. United States, Report No. 26/06, petition 434-03, 
2006. 
IACmHR, Jesus Tranquilino Vélez Loor v. Panama, Report No. 95/06, petition 92-04, 2006.  
IACmHR, José Maria Guimarães v. Brazil, Report No. 60/13, petition 1242-07, 2013. 
IACmHR, José Xavier Gando Chica v. Ecuador, Report No. 22/12, petition 398-02, 2012. 
IACmHR, José Adrián Mejía Mendoza et al. v. El Salvador, Report No. 119/12, petition 185-
03, 2012. 
IACmHR, José Maria Guimarães v. Brazil, Report No. 60/13, petition 1242-07, 2013.  
IACmHR, José Sánchez Guner Espinales et al. v. Costa Rica, Report No. 37/01, petition 
11.529, 2001. 
IACmHR, Jorge Portilla Ponce v. Ecuador, Report No. 106/09, petition 12.323, 2009. 
IACmHR, Jorge Teobaldo Pinzas Salazar vs Peru, Report No. 107/06, petition 12.318, 2006. 
  58   
 
IACmHR, Juan Ramón Chamorro Quiroz v. Costa Rica, Report No. 89/00, petition 11.495, 
2000. 
IACmHR, Juan Echeverría Manzo and Mauricio Espinoza González v Chile, Report no. 
108/13, petition 4636-02, 2013.  
IACmHR, La Granja, Ituango v. Colombia, Report No. 57/00, petition 12.050, 2000. 
IACmHR, Lara Preciado v. Mexico, Report No. 45/96, petition 11.492, 1996.  
IACmHR, Luis Edgar Vera Flores vs Peru, Report No. 86/05, petition 4416-02, 2005. 
IACmHR, María Mercedes Zapata Parra v. Peru, Report No. 45/09, petition 12.079, 2009. 
IACmHR, Marcela Andrea Valdez Diaz vs Chile, Report no 57/03, petition 12.337, 2003. 
IACmHR, Marcelo Sánchez Mourazos v Argentina, Report No. 157/10, petition 696-03, 
2010. 
IACmHR, Márcia Cristina Rigo Leopoldi v. Brazil, Report No. 9/12, petition 11.996, 2012. 
IACmHR, Mario Eduardo Firmenich v Argentina, Report No. 17/89, petition 10.037, 1989. 
IACmHR, Mario Alfredo Lares-Reyes et al. v. United States, Report No. 19/02, petition 
12.379, 2002 
IACmHR, Miguel Ricardo de Arriba Escola v Honduras, Report No. 102/06, Petition 97-04, 
2006. 
IACmHR, Naranjo Cardenas vs Venezuela, Report no. 70/04, petition 667/01, 2004. 
IACmHR, Ojo de Agua v. Mexico, Report No. 73/99, petition 11.701, 1999.  
IACmHR, Ramón Martinez Villareal v. United States, Report No. 108/00, petition 11.753, 
2000. 
IACmHR, Reyes v. Chile, Report No. 60/03, petition 12.108, 2003.  
IACmHR, Rolando Ernesto Gómez García and Bernarda Liliana Gómez García v. Honduras, 
Report No. 121/12, petition 764-03, 2012.  
IACmHR, Santos Soto Ramírez et al., Mexico, Report No. 68/01, petition 12,117, 2001.  
IACmHR, Victor Nicholas Sanchez et al v. United States, Report No. 104/05, petition 65/99, 
2005. 
IACmHR, Víctor Eladio Lara Bolívar v. Peru, Report No. 18/11, petition 871-03, 2011. 
IACmHR, Workers of the Empresa Nacional de Telecomunicaciones (ENTEL) v. Argentina, 
Report No. 116/12, Petition 374-97, 2012. 
  59   
 
IACmHR, Zulema Tarazona Arriate et al., Peru, Report No. 83/01, petition 11,581, 2001. 
IACmHR, Annual report 2013, avaliable at: 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2013/TOC.asp 
IACmHR, Annual report 2012, avaliable at: 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2012/TOC.asp 
IACmHR, Annual report 2011, avaliable at: 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/docs/annual/2011/TOC.asp 
IACmHR, Annual report 2010, avaliable at: 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2010eng/TOC.htm 
IACmHR, Annual report 2009, avaliable at: 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2009eng/TOC.htm 
IACmHR, Annual report 2008, avaliable at: 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2008eng/TOC.htm 
IACmHR, Annual report 2007, avaliable at: 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2007eng/TOC.htm 
IACmHR, Annual report 2006, avaliable at: 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/sitios/informes/docs/ENG/eng_2006.pdf 
IACmHR, Annual report 2005, avaliable at: http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2005eng/toc.htm 
IACmHR, Annual report 2004, avaliable at: http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/toc.htm  
European Court of Human Rights: 
ECtHR, Case of Akdivar and Others v. Turkey, Application no. 21893/93, September 16, 
1996. 
ECtHR, De Wilde, Ooms and Verpsy Cases (“Vagrancy”) v. Belgium, June 18, 1971. 
ECtHR, Wemhoff v. Germany, Application no 2122/64, June 27, 1968. 
ECtHR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, Application no. 5310/71, January 18, 1978.  
ECtHR, Foti and others v. Italy, Application no. 7604/76; 7719/76; 7781/77; 7913/77, De-
cember 10, 1982.  
ECtHR, Ringeisen v. Austria, merits, Application no. 2614/65, July 16, 1971.  
ECtHR, Zimmerman and Steiner v. Switzerland, Application no. 8737/79, July 13, 1983.  
  60   
 
ECmHR, M.A.R. v. United Kingdom, Application 28038/95, 16 January 1997, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b696c.html  
ECmHR, Fadele Emanuel, Fadele Kehinde, Fadele Taiwo, Fadele Victor v. United King-
dom, Application No. 13078/87, 12 February 1990, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b678c.html  
Council of Europe, Protocoll No. 11, 1994.  
International Court of Justice: 
ICJ, Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of 
the Congo), preliminary objections, May 24, 2007. 
ICJ, Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (United States of America vs Italy), July 20, 1989. 
ICJ, Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (United States of America vs Italy), dissenting opinion 
of Judge Schwebel , July 20, 1989. 
ICJ, Case of Interhandel, (United States of America v. Switzerland) Preliminary objections, 
March 21, 1959.  
ICJ, Case of Interhandel (United States of America v. Switzerland) Preliminary objections, 
separate opinion of Judge Cordova, 1959. 
ICJ, Case of Interhandel (United States of America v. Switzerland) Preliminary objections, 
separate opinion of Judge Armand-Ugon, 1959.  
ICJ, Certain Norwegian Loans (France v. Norway), Separate opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, 
July 6, 1957. 
ICJ, Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, Prelimi-
nary Objections, (Belgium vs. Spain), separate opinion of Judge Morelli’s, 1970. 
ICJ, Case Concerning The Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited, Prelimi-
nary Objections, (Belgium vs. Spain), separate opinion of Judge Tanaka, 1970.  
Permanent Court of International Justice: 
PCIJ, Panevezys-Saldutikis Railway Case (Estonia v. Lithuania), Series A/B, No. 76, Judge 
Hudson’s dissenting opinion, February 28, 1939.  
PCIJ, Phosphates in Morocco Case (France vs Italy), Series A/B, No. 74, June 14, 1938.  
Human Rights Committee: 
HRC, Brough v. Australia, Communication No. 1184/2003, March 2006.  
HRC, Calle Sevigny v. France, Communication No. 1283/2004, 2005. 
  61   
 
HRC, Lassaad Aouf v. Belgium, Communication No. 1010/2001, 2006. 
HRC, Lim Soo Ja v. Australia, Communication No. 1175/2003, 2006. 
HRC, P.S. v. Denmark, Communication No. 397/1990, 1992. 
HRC, R.T. v. France, Communication No. 262/1987, 1989. 
Other:  
CtAT, A.H. v. Sweden, Communication No. 250/2004, 2006. 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Gelle v. Denmark, Communication 
No34/2004, 2006.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  62   
 
Annex 
Annex 1: Inadmissible cases Commission 2009-2013 
  Year Report No Petition No Country Inadmissible due to art. 
1 2013 107/13 89-00 Argentina art 46 (1) (a) 
2 2013 60/13 1242-07 Brazil art 46 (1) (a) 
3 2013 11/13 157-06 Chile art 46(1) (a) 
4 2013 12/13 692-04 Honduras art 46(1) (a) 
5 2013 13/13 670-01 Venezuela art 46(1) (a) 
6 2013 108/13 4636-02 Chile art 46 (1) (b) 
7 2013 106/13 951-01 Argentina art 46(1) (a) 
8 2012 30/12 736-03 Peru art 47 (b) 
9 2012 31/12 12.222 Peru art 47 (b) 
10 2012 32/12 170-00 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
11 2012 33/12 12.202 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
12 2012 24/12 859-03 Mexico art 47 (b) 
13 2012 60/12 513-04 Mexico art 46 (1) (b) 
14 2012 119/12 185-03 El Salvador art 46(1) (a) 
15 2012 22/12 398-02 Ecuador art 46(1) (a) 
16 2012 9/12 11.996 Brazil art 47 (b) 
17 2012 25/12 700-04 Mexico art 46(1) (a) 
18 2012 23/12 1180-04 Guatemala art 47 (b) 
19 2012 120/12 1119-06 Guatemala art 47 (b) 
20 2012 121/12 764-03 Honduras art 47 (b) 
21 2012 118/12 12.297 Peru art 47 (b) 
22 2012 116/12 374-97 Argentina art 46(1) (a) 
23 2012 117/12 86-07 Brazil art 47 (b) 
24 2012 21/12 P-885-03 Brazil art 47 (b) 
25 2011 165/11 492-02 Mexico art 47 (b) 
26 2011 174/11 342-02 Mexico art 46 (1) (b) 
27 2011 166/11 970-06 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
28 2011 118/11 182-03 Peru art 47 (b) 
29 2011 120/11 55-05 Peru art 46 (1) (a) and 47 (b) 
30 2011 16/11 12.074 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
31 2011 119/11 648-98 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
32 2011 17/11 277-01 Peru art 46 (1) (b) 
33 2011 18/11 871-03 Peru art 46 (1) (b) 
34 2011 15/11 222-03 Peru art 47 (b) 
35 2010 157/10 696-03 Argentina art 46 (1) (a) and 47 (b) 
36 2010 44/10 473-03 Mexico art 47 (b) 
37 2010 159/10 1250-06 Uruguay art 46 (1) (b) 
38 2010 89/10 12.499 Paraguay art 46(1) (a) 
39 2010 158/10 167-99 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
40 2010 80/10 12.280 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
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41 2010 79/10 12.119 Peru art 46 (1) (b) and 47 (b) 
42 2010 13/10 480-00 Peru art 47 (b) 
43 2010 14/10 2576-02 Peru art 46 (1) (b) 
44 2010 5/10 12.118 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
45 2009 39/09 717-00 Argentina art 46(1) (a) 
46 2009 134/09 1133-04 and 115-05 Brazil art 47 (b) 
47 2009 133/09 989-04 Brazil art 47 (b) 
48 2009 132/09 644-05 Brazil art 47 (b) 
49 2009 119/09 398-04 Brazil art 47 (b) 
50 2009 118/09 397-04 Brazil art 46 (1) (b) 
51 2009 63/09 544-03 Brazil art 47 (b) 
52 2009 40/09 442-05 Chile art 47 (b) 
53 2009 106/09 12.323 Ecuador art 46(1) (a) 
54 2009 41/09 459-03 Guatemala art 46(1) (a) 
55 2009 135/09 291-05 Peru art 46(1) (a) and 47 (d) 
56 2009 45/09 12.079 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
57 2009 44/09 12.161 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
58 2009 43/09 1166-04 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
59 2009 42/09 443-03 Peru art 46(1) (a) 
 
Annex 2: Cases deemed inadmissible according to country, 2009-2013 
Year  
Inadmissible 
petitions 
Inadmissible due 
to non-exhaustion 
% inadmissible 
due to non-
exhaustion 
Argentina 5 5 100 % 
Brazil 10 1 10 % 
Chile 3 1 33 % 
El Salvador 1 1 100 % 
Ecuador 2 2 100 % 
Honduras 2 1 50 % 
Guatemala 3 1 33 % 
Mexico 6 1 17 % 
Peru 24 14 58 % 
Paraguay 1 1 100 % 
Uruguay 1 0 0 % 
Venezuela 1 1 100 % 
Total 59 29 49 % 
 
 
